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This thesis is an investigation of how United States 
foreign policy was made in the context of German-American 
relations in the period between the two world wars. The 
problem under investigation is whether the United States 
was using a corporatist approach in dealing with the 
problems of Germany and ultimately Europe and whether the 
corporatist model is a good one for analyzing foreign policy 
2 
development during this period. Corporatism, as it is used 
in this thesis, is defined as an organizational form which 
recognizes privately organized functional groups outside the 
United States government, which collaborate with the 
government to share power and make policy. In the case of 
foreign policy, the focus of this investigation is on the 
role played by autonomous financial experts, especially from 
the banking community. 
The data used in making this investigation comes from 
secondary sources, both books and articles, and primary 
sources. The books are works written by historians which 
cover both the entire period, specific crisis points in 
the period, and biographies of the main people involved, 
usually focusing on their foreign policies. A number of 
articles are also cited and these deal both with specific 
problems of the period and also with questions of 
historiography, especially corporatist historiography. In 
addition, primary sources make up a significant amount of 
the data. These include both memoirs of the key individuals 
involved in foreign policy and also documents on foreign 
policy of both the United States and Germany, the latter 
consisting primarily of correspondence between the chief 
government officials involved in foreign policy. The 
university library is certainly adequate for an 
investigation of this type, though naturally a certain 
amount of the primary documentation for such a project can 
not be found in one library as it is stored in archives in 
in other parts of both the United States and Germany. 
3 
The results of this investigation can be summarized as 
follows: the corporatist approach was used and the model is 
valid for examining diplomacy in the 1920's, but fails to 
explain what happened in the 1930's. The methods involved 
in formulating policy to deal with Germany and Europe 
changed significantly from the Republican administrations of 
the 1920's to the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
The change actually began partially under President Hoover, 
one of the original "associationalists", associationalism 
being another word used by historians to describe 
corporatism. It is thus concluded that the corporatist 
model serves some periods better than others and is 
therefore not the ideal vehicle for the examination of 
foreign policy making over longer periods of time. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of 
corporatism on the relations between the United States and 
Germany in the 1920's and 1930's. I believe the corporatist 
model is a good one for examining the relations in the 
1920's but is found wanting in explaining German-American 
dealings in the 1930's, especially from 1933 on when both 
Adolf Hitler and Franklin D. Roosevelt had assumed power. 
The corporatist historians that have been writing over the 
past two decades seem to skip over this period as though it 
was an aberration and pick up corporatist development in the 
post-World War II period. But this is not helpful in 
examining how relations were carried out if the corporatist 
model is indeed useful for explaining diplomatic history in 
any given period as the proponents would have it. 
Traditionally, diplomatic historians have interpreted the 
history of American foreign policy through dichotomies, or 
competing opposites. These have usually included isolationism 
versus internationalism, idealism versus realism, imperialism 
versus anti-imperialism, and revolutionary versus reactionary 
paradigms. The corporatist revisionism seeks a unifying 
synthesis to explain the conduct of foreign policy rather than 
2 
relying on these dichotomies. The old dichotomies still 
have some worth however, and I believe the balance between 
rule by elite versus rule by democratic forces is a useful 
one to examine in the context of foreign policy in the 
1920's and 1930's. 
American diplomatic history began after World War 1 
with the nationalist perspective of Samuel Flagg Bemis and 
Dexter Perkins. This approach emphasized the emergence of 
the United States as a world power and described traditional 
European style balance of power, bilateral diplomacy. The 
progressive, or revisionist historians, led by Charles 
Beard, focused more on the intellectual foundations and 
conflict-induced change which guided American foreign 
policy. This led to the critical realist historiography of 
the 1950's and 1960's, exemplified by those like George 
Kennan, who concerned themselves with elites creating policy 
to pursue nationalist aims. They emphasized geopolitics and 
were critical of the influence of domestic pressures. The 
revisionists of the 1960's and 1970's, such as William 
Appleman Williams, focused more on idealism and the wayward 
capitalism that led to such ill-founded ventures as the 
Vietnam War. This economic causation approach was modified 
by postrevisionists, such as John Lewis Gaddis, who tended 
toward seeing policy as a reaction to the threat of Soviet 





Thomas G. Paterson maintains that diplomatic historians 
concentrate on four basic levels: international, regional, 
national, and individual. 2 Corporatist historians take all 
of these levels into consideration in their attempt to 
include both internal and external factors in policy making. 
The corporatist approach is most concerned with describing 
the organizational form of foreign policy formulation. 
Corporatist historians have described not only the 
components of the American system that have influenced 
foreign policy, but also, as with Charles Maier, the 
corporatist reorganization of Europe in the 1920's. 3 
Corporatist historians, such as Michael J. Hogan and 
Maier, define corporatism as an organizational form between 
traditional laissez-faire capitalism and state control of 
enterprise and policy. It recognizes privately organized 
functional groups outside of the government, most commonly 
business, labor, and agriculture, which through coordinating 
mechanisms collaborate with the government to share power. 
In this way public policy results from semiautonomous 
agencies of nonpartisan experts. For the purpose of this 
analysis, business interests figure more heavily into the 
foreign policy equation than do agriculture or labor, thus 
they will play a more prominent role in this analysis. More 
roughly put, these sectors become bargaining units, along 
with the government, which acts also as a mediator, and a 
certain equilibrium is reached. This was certainly the case 
in Germany in the 1920's as described by Maier, though the 
equilibrium was certainly fragile. 4 
4 
Critics of the corporatist model, such as Gaddis, 
believe that it serves certain periods very well, such as 
the 1920's, when there was broad agreement towards foreign 
policy, but not for other periods, such as the 1930's, which 
lacked consensus.5 He goes on to criticize corporatism for 
ignoring differences within the functional groups, such as 
the division between the international finance sector of 
business and those middle to small sized concerns that that 
were more interested in the domestic market. Gaddis also 
maintained that corporatist theory ignores how the 
geopolitical situation effects U.S. policy (for example, the 
increasing militancy of Nazi Germany), it downplays ideals 
(such as President Wilson's post-war internationalist 
cooperation), and that it ignores the roles of individuals 
(except for Herbert Hoover). 5 Proponents of corporatism, 
such as Hogan, refute these criticisms with examples such as 
the attention leading bankers received; the divisiveness of 
the 1920's; that the emphasis is not on consensus but on 
power formation, and that geopolitical considerations were 
the key to post-World War II internationalism, as well as 
the Republican vision of American prosperity and world 
stability in the 1920's. 
Corporatist historians are concerned with 
organizational developments in the twentieth century. 6 
5 
Capitalism in the late nineteenth century was dominated by 
individuals, or the captains of industry, in the United 
States. What economic historians call the organizational 
revolution began around the turn of the century and was 
characterized by the rise of the corporation as the primary 
form of big business management. The leading politicians of 
the time, led by Progressives like President Theodore 
Roosevelt, did not fight this development, but saw it as 
necessary to counter the cartels which had developed in 
Europe. Roosevelt wanted these corporations to work in 
concert with the government and accept some restraint in the 
interests of the American people. The government would act 
as a mediator between corporate concerns and other groups, 
such as labor. If this was the genesis of the corporatist 
idea, the actual practice of it occured during World War I, 
with the introduction of the War Industries Boards, which 
established the pattern of business-government collaboration 
meant to ensure the most efficient production and use of 
resources for the prosecution of the War. 
Michael J. Hogan emphasizes the need for diplomatic 
historians to develop a framework that deals with both the 
domestic and international forces that shape policy.
7 As a 
leading proponent of corporatist theory, he believes it is 
an adequate model because it describes the organization of 
decision making. It deals with functional elites in the 
leading organized groups (like business, labor and 
6 
agriculture) and how they inter-act with government. The 
role of traditional governing classes is de-emphasized. The 
dynamics of the business-government collaboration form the 
basis for foreign policy analysis in this model. Hogan 
speaks of a New Deal coalition that "elaborated the 
corporative design envisioned by Republican leaders a decade 
earlier". 8 But the New Deal focus was on domestic policy. 
In the 1920's, Republicans collaborated with industry 
and finance to push traditional Open Door policies and 
dollar diplomacy. Government would join, in an 
associational relationship, with nonpartisan "expert" 
commissions to scientifically solve problems of war debts 
and tariffs and find the key to economic and thus political 
stability. Hogan goes on to state that good corporatist 
historians show how the system was flawed and led in part to 
the economic collapse of the 1930's as well as showing that 
party politics, congressional pressures, and public opinion 
all played a significant role. 9 
Melvyn P. Leffler says that the contrasting themes of 
political isolationism and economic expansionism are useful 
frameworks for investigating American foreign policy between 
the wars. They just don't go far enough toward a complete 
synthesis. 10 He doesn't believe that American policy makers 
were naive in failing to make political commitments or 
ignoring the political realities, nor does he believe that 
the United States was setting up an international economic 
system that would ensure its predominance. He feels the 
answer is somewhere in between, that the United States 
wanted European stability not only for its own sake but to 
further American self-interest as well. The problem, as he 
outlines it, was how to achieve this while maintaining 
domestic priorities and staying out of European conflicts 
that were not vital to American interests. 11 
7 
The corporatist vision stems from the belief that there 
is a multiplicity of causes, both internal and external, and 
that there are many participating groups in the formation of 
international relations. Charles S. Maier reminds us that 
the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes pointed out in the 
seventeenth century that the international system is unique 
in that it has no sovereign and is not governed by a 
standardized system of laws. 12 Instead it is a more 
haphazard system that develops according to international 
competition and takes into account political structures, 
cultural differences, and economic arrangements. 
In this respect, economic considerations are extremely 
important to the study of German-American relations in the 
inter-war period. People in the business and financial 
worlds played leading roles in formulating policy, 
especially in the 1920's. The corporatist perspective 
incorporates these roles into a formal structure of decision 
making. 
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CHAPTER II 
CORPORATIST BEGINNINGS 
Corporatist historians maintain that the corporatist 
structure began taking shape with the Progressive Era, when 
government recognized the need to harness industrial growth 
and mediate among the main interest groups. On the 
international level, business feared destructive price 
competition and the hope was that government could 
contribute to stability. 
Corporatism became institutionalized during World War I 
as War Industries Boards were set up to make the most 
efficient use of the nation's resources for war 
mobilization. These boards were composed of private 
civilian elites and executive branch appointees; a 
collaboration of business and government which determined 
price and production levels. 1 These would serve as the 
model for corporatism and organized collaboration was the 
key. The degree of organization becomes critical for 
determining whether the corporatist model fits the 1930's as 
well as it seemed to fit the 1920's. 
Though the United States did not join the League of 
Nations after World War I, corporatist historians argue that 
the policy makers of the post-war period sought economic and 
10 
financial structures that paralled the political cooperative 
structures of the League. 2 Some felt this development was 
anti-democratic because non-elected people were creating 
important policy that affected the nation. Ironically 
enough, as the elected representatives in the Senate 
rejected an American participation in the League and the 
Versailles Treaty, they eliminated any American governmental 
presence on the committees that were set up to deal with the 
reparations problem. The result was that representation on 
these committees would end up consisting of prominent 
members of the financial world. This was a continuation 
of the war-time situation however. And as Beth McKillen 
points out, many Americans were less than satisfied, 
especially those in the Labor movement, with this 
centralization of wartime economic power in executive 
appointees. 3 Dissatisfaction was felt by ethnic groups and 
middle-sized business, which complained of corporate 
domination of and profit from the boards. McKillen believes 
this formed some of the opposition to the League and 
President Wilson's view of a new internationalist order. 
But despite opposition to this Wilsonian view, American 
policy, through the action of private elites, reflected a 
desire for an international economic order. This calls into 
question whether the corporatist design was intentional and 
premeditated or merely arrived at by chance and 
circumstance. 
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The Republicans who came into office in 1921 believed 
that economics would determine the level of peace and 
stability the world would experience. Growth and 
cooperation were essential in their eyes. Industrial and 
technological progress had made the world more economically 
interdependent. As Leffler points out, this was not 
necessarily an ideologically based notion, but one born of 
the realization that political and military balances and 
alliances had been inadequate to prevent World War r. 4 Both 
prominent politicians, such as Secretary of State Frank B. 
Kellogg and Senator William E. Borah, and prominent bankers 
and businessmen, like Owen D. Young, concurred in this 
belief that commercial and financial stability were the keys 
to peace and prosperity. 5 They felt international problems 
could be solved scientifically through the use of "experts" 
and business methods which would take them out of the 
political realm. They would lead the way economically, 
maintaining the freedom to pursue their own national 
interests through the Open Door, which would in turn 
stimulate the world market and bring international economic 
stability. However, there were serious dangers in the 
failure to recognize the political ramifications of their 
economic policy, especially in Germany. Furthermore, the 
failure to publically admit and deal with the connection 
between allied war debts and German reparations payments, 
all the way through to and including Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
12 
can also be seen as a critical misjudgement. The loan 
policy toward Germany, which offically began with the Dawes 
Plan in 1924, calls into serious question the degree to 
which government and the financial leaders closely 
coordinated their policy and actions, which reflects 
negatively on the corporatist vision. 
This was clearly a transitional period for the United 
States. The 1920's was the last decade of laissez faire 
capitalism in the economic sphere and the long road from the 
nation's early fear of entangling alliances to interwar 
isolationism in the political sphere would soon come to a 
crashing halt as well. But coming out of World War I 
successfully and relatively unscathed, the United States 
emerged as the world economic superpower and had a moral 
egotism to match it. President Harding felt America was the 
greatest contributor to human welfare in history. He was 
followed by Coolidge, who said "America first is not 
selfishness: it is the righteous demand of strength to 
serve." After this came President Hoover, who thought the 
American system was the promise of the human race. 6 These 
attitudes and ideals combined with the fact that the U.S. 
emerged from the War as a creditor rather than a debtor 
nation. Republican policy would allow the private financial 
sector to pursue policies which amounted to foreign 
intervention while the public sector denied there were major 
political implications for this intervention, thereby 
maintaining the facade of isolationism and conforming to 
public and congressional sentiment. 
13 
If there was a failure to make connections between 
economic and political policies, there was also a failure to 
see certain economic connections that would have caused 
political conflict. If politicians were afraid to make the 
connection between allied war debts and reparations, bankers 
were equally cautious, if less naive, in prolonging this 
policy. The circular flow of money from American banks to 
Germany in the form of loans, went on to the former allies 
as hard currency reparations payments and then back to the 
United States as debt repayment. Both reparations and 
allied debt installments were scheduled to run into the 
1980's. They barely lasted into the 1930's before payments 
were ended, first through a moratorium and then permanently 
by Hitler. But it was a political minefield to attempt 
cancelling debts. It was equally politically unpopular to 
bring down the tariff barriers, which would have been 
necessary to allow German exports into the United States to 
a degree to which they could realistically have contributed 
to Germany's hard currency reserve. If the Germans couldn't 
export to any significant degree they would be hard pressed 
to raise the hard currency needed for reparations transfers. 
The loan policy served as an escape hatch but would bring 
increasing pressure on the German government, both at the 
state and national level, to pursue an austerity program of 
14 
higher taxes and lower government spending. 
Politically, the United States had expressed its desire 
to stay out of European affairs with the Senate's rejection 
of an American role in the Versailles Treaty and the League 
of Nations after the War. Economically, U.S. policy sought 
to restore European stability and international trade. 
German economic recovery was vital to these aims and to 
accomplish this, faith in its currency had to be restored. 
The loan policy had this objective. But as it went along 
increasingly unsupervised by the American government, it led 
to spending sprees, especially at the state and municipal 
level, by German local governments. In a new and fragile 
democracy they felt this was necessary to survive 
politically as the economic situation grew worse, but it led 
to financial instability and increasing political acrimony 
within Germany, which was racked by political extremism 
7 after the War. 
The issue of Germany's ability and will to pay was 
always very close to the heart of the matter. Some 
economists felt that those responsible for the Versailles 
settlement were ignorant of the most basic facts of trade. 8 
He began with the basic economic premise that a nation 
cannot not sell if it will not buy, that imports pay for 
exports; sums owed equal sums due. The burden of this post-
war readjustment would fall, he felt, on the farmers and 
other exporters. Mercantilism was dead but nations were 
15 
still trying to practice economic nationalism. He felt that 
reparations would produce the opposite of what was desired 
(writing in 1926). In order for Germany to pay, they would 
have had to export much more than Britain or France. Thus 
tariffs were a result of looking at national advantage 
rather than stability for the world economy. He thought 
that reparations were the greatest obstacle to restoring the 
markets of Europe, a necessary condition for American 
farmers and manufacturers to prosper. He claimed 
reparations were calculated on Germany's ability to produce 
rather than its ability to export, especially with regard to 
the Allied unwillingness to buy. 
John Maynard Keynes was another believer in the idea 
that reparation policy was ill-founded. Writing in the 
early 1920's, he worked out equations which showed payment 
would be next to impossible. 9 He began by citing German 
losses: colonies, mercantile marine, ten percent of her 
territory, one-third of its coal producing capacity, three-
quarters of its iron ore, and two million men. 10 
Furthermore, they were suffering currency depreciation and 
revolution. Even with all this the Allies had to assume 
that Germany would be able to trade more than it had before 
the war, because only exports could help them raise the cash 
or credit they would need to convert payments. 
But Germany actually had a negative balance of payments 
before the War: imports exceeded exports by an average of 74 
16 
million pounds sterling in the five years ending in 1913. 11 
The total negative balance was not as bad because of 
interest from foreign securities and profits from shipping, 
but these would now be eliminated. Among their leading 
exports were iron, which came largely from now lost 
territory: machinery, in which increases were possible: coal 
and coke, of which no increase could be expected: wool, 
cereal, cotton and leather, from which substantial increases 
could not be expected. The losses of Alsace-Lorraine and 
Upper Silesia were critical. On top of this, Germany would 
have to cut imports which would lower the standard of living 
to an extent that would be politically difficult. Keynes 
also believed, as economists like Herbert Fraser did, that 
German ability to pay was calculated on annual surplus 
productivity rather than surplus of exports. 12 
Keynes wanted to see the Versailles Treaty revised 
through the League of Nations, specifically under article 
XIX of the Covenant, which stated: "The Assembly may from 
time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the 
League of treaties which may have become inapplicable and 
the consideration of international conditions whose 
continuance might endanger the peace of the world." He 
realized this was only an advisory capacity and would be 
difficult to implement, but felt economic changes were 
necessary for the economic well being of Europe. 13 
Keynes proposed a total reparation bill of 2 billion 
pounds sterling, which would include lost property 
(including ships) and territory, to be paid off over 30 
years. 14 In reality, the Allies ended up demanding over 
17 
five times that much, 132 billion marks, to be paid off over 
60 years. 15 This total, demanded through the London 
Ultimatum of May 5, 1921, was eventually accepted by the 
coalition government headed by Joseph Wirth, after the 
previous government resigned over the crisis. This began 
the policy of "fulfillment", so distasteful to the 
Nationalists in Germany, which meant to show through good 
intentions that the reparations were unreasonable and could 
never be fully paid. Some felt that Germany launched a 
successful propaganda campaign against the reparations and 
that their resistance to paying was more important than the 
ability to pay, when considering the fact that only about 20 
billion gold marks were ever paid. 16 
Keynes also proposed the cancellation of inter-allied 
debts and sending the reparations to the most damaged 
countries. The United States was the primary lender, though Britain 
lent more than it borrowed. Thus the United States would 
have had to sacrifice the most, having extended credits 
worth 7.3 billion pounds during the War and another 2.3 
billion pounds in the immediate post-War period. 17 Keynes 
thought the huge, unprecedented amounts caused additional 
problems because they were inter-governmental and not based 
on any real property or assets. They were paper 
18 
entanglements that the banks were not used to. He didn't 
believe that they would be paid for more than a few years. 18 
The official American attitude toward reparations was 
more lenient toward Germany than was that of the allies; 
they believed capacity to pay should determine the 
settlement. They also denied the connection with war-debts 
and resisted Allied proposals for cancellation. Both Wilson 
and the Republicans who followed him wanted American policy 
based on the Open Door, a liberal commercial policy of 
peaceful competition as opposed to the traditional European 
model of imperialism. At Paris during the peace 
negotiations, Wilson had settled for a somewhat powerless 
Reparations Commission in the hope that the League would 
deal with the problem. 19 
Secretary of State Hughes continued Wilsonian ideals 
even though he represented the Republicans. His efforts 
would eventually result in the Dawes Plan. But in March of 
1921 a crisis developed between Germany and the Allies over 
payment of reparations. German Foreign Minister Walter 
Simons met with British Prime Minister Lloyd George and 
French Premier Aristide Briand, hoping to convince them to 
lower the indemnity. If Simons could not come up with an 
acceptable proposal, the Allies would occupy key Rhineland 
towns and force compliance. On March 21 they did just that 
and impounded customs receipts to compensate for lack of 
payment as Simons' proposals fell short of approva1. 20 At 
19 
this point, Simons appealed to the American commissioner in 
Berlin, Ellis L. Dresel. Dresel, in a telegram to Hughes, 
felt the Germans were more sincere in their efforts to pay a 
reasonable amount than the Allies gave them credit for. He 
went on to recognize one of the essential points, "the 
creation of important sums in foreign exchange is possible 
for Germany only through a strong increase in its exports." 
"An enormous increase would be necessary in order to regain 
great sums and what dangers this would mean for the economic 
life of other countries." "The financial needs of the 
Allies can only be taken care of by means of credits. The 
prerequisite for German credit abroad is Germany's financial 
responsibility. This, however, is wholly undermined by the 
Allies themselves who in the Treaty of Versailles have 
reserved for themselves a first mortgage on the total wealth 
and all sources of income of the German commonwealth and 
21 states." He went on to say that Germany would be 
willing to take over the Allied debts and would submit to an 
examination of its ability to pay by a group of unbiased 
22 experts. 
William R. Castle, Jr., the chief of the European 
Division of the Department of State, warned Hughes to be 
careful of any mediation role and not give an impression 
that the United States was mainly interested in building 
trade, which could cause friction between the United States 
and the Allies.
23 
Hughes then replied to Simons that the 
20 
United States still held Germany "responsible for the war 
and therefore morally bound to make reparation, so far as it 
be possible. 1124 
On April 20, Simons asked that President Harding serve 
as a mediator on the reparations question. He claimed the 
proposals as they stood would lead to "nothing ahead but 
political chaos. In his opinion no government could stand 
which accepted Paris proposals." Simons also maintained 
that Germany could not allow gold reserves to leave the 
country because this would decimate the value of the mark. 25 
The next day Dresel again communicated to Hughes, relaying 
German concerns: they wished to know what Germany's annual 
productive capacity was and how a surplus was to be gained 
from it and made available. Further, "Germany sincerely 
trusts that the President of United States will feel he can 
nominate commission of impartial experts to make 
investigations and present verdict as to these problems. 
Germany is willing to agree to such decisions as are based 
on determinations of the commission." They agreed to make 
up the difference between "the interest and sinking fund on 
international loan" with compensation in services and 
material. They also again expressed a willingness to assume 
the Allied war-debts. 26 Hughes replied, "This Government 
could not agree to mediate the question of reparations with 
a view to acting as umpire in its settlement", but that they 
"would be willing with concurrence of Allied Governments to 
take part in the negotiations if Germany seeks to resume 
them on a sound basis." 27 
In a conversation with the British and French 
Ambassadors, Hughes raised the issue of "when the 
psychological moment had been reached which gave to the 
Allied Powers the utmost advantage; that it would be a 
serious thing to press to the point where Germany should 
succumb to a feeling of pessimism." He maintained that it 
was a question for economic experts to determine how much 
Germany should pay, that they should pay to the utmost of 
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their capacity, but that world economic well-being would be 
served by having Germany a productive power. He also warned 
of the unforeseen consequences of resorting to occupation 
t . 28 as a sane ion. 
On April 28, the Reparations Commission decided 
unanimously to fix the reparations at 132 billion gold 
marks. 29 The United States did not interfere with this 
decision and the Germans went away disappointed. The Allies 
threatened occupation of the Ruhr valley, the German 
government collapsed and the new government pledged to carry 
out the obligations. 
Castle had wanted Hughes to push for American 
representation on the Reparations Commission, but Hughes was 
hampered by domestic political objections to such a role. 
The most ardent anti-internationalists claimed that they 
would block President Harding's domestic program if Hughes 
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carried through and Harding gave in. 30 Senators William 
Borah and Hiram Johnson fought against involvement in the 
Versailles Treaty and the political entanglements they were 
sure would ensue. The Allies did invite the Harding 
administration to send representatives to participate in 
various treaty bodies and Hughes did send unofficial 
observers, such as Roland w. Boyden, to sit in on the 
Reparations Commission, thus skirting around congressional 
t . 1 t. 31 s ipu a ions. The senators protested but could do 
nothing. They did, however, make it part of the Treaty of 
Berlin, the separate peace with Germany, concluded in 
October, 1921, that the United States repudiated the League 
of Nations and that the Treaty of Versailles would not be 
brought up again in the Senate for a ratification vote. 
This search for a way to avoid congressional pressure for 
non-involvement would help determine Republican foreign 
policy and led towards the corporatist solution. In this 
way it was at times more improvisation than design. 
Melvyn Leffler believed that the American war debt 
policy resulted from the "uneasy compromises between hostile 
branches of government, which themselves were racked by a 
multitude of conflicting pressures and irreconcilable 
goals. 1132 He analyzed it in the context of the open door 
thesis, which stated that American foreign policy was guided 
by domestic pressures to seek foreign markets in order to 
absorb America's surplus production. He claims historians 
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who traditionally called American debt policy short-sighted, 
provincial, and overly concerned with public opinion, 
ignored certain groups who recognized the interdependence of 
the European and American economies. These groups included 
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade 
Council, the American Bankers Association, and the American 
Farm Bureau; all of whom worried about depreciating foreign 
currencies and unstable exchange rates. They recognized the 
link between these problems and the war debt and so they 
were often the leading proponents of deferred interest 
payments or the cancellation of part of the debt. In 
response, they wanted the Allied debtor nations to reduce 
reparations, balance budgets, stabilize currencies, 
liberalize trade, and cut armament spending. 33 
Leffler claimed that these economic leaders and 
interest groups did not go for complete cancellation, the 
logical way to restore European purchasing power and 
stabilize currencies, because they feared the public 
reaction and the increase in already heavy domestic taxation 
that would surely occur. 34 The burden of paying off the 
debt would be shifted to the American taxpayer. Instead, 
they believed they could attack the crux of the problem, the 
onerous reparations, by contributing to a settlement and 
then pumping up the European economy with loans. 35 
President Harding was aware of this view among the bankers, 
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such as Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan and Company, and held 
regular meetings with them. The Secretary of the Treasury, 
Andrew Mellon, asked Congress for exclusive control over 
these debt questions in June of 1921. Congress refused to 
go along with this scheme and set up a five man commission, 
with the Secretary as chairman, to deal with the debts. 
They also set up a payment and interest rate schedule (not 
less than 4.25% twenty-five year period). 36 Congress over a 
insisted on its constitutional right to control finances, 
distrusted the executive branch, and felt exchanging British 
and French obligations for practically worthless German ones 
would be foolhardy. 37 They were most interested in avoiding 
a heavier tax burden on the American people. 
Leffler argued that the Harding administration was 
quite aware of the debt's impact and its link to the 
reparations problem. In fact they gave serious 
consideration to the plan of a prominent banker, S.R. 
Bertron, which advocated Britain cancelling France's debt, 
France reducing the reparations and gaining the proceeds of 
a five billion dollar loan to Germany. 38 It was ultimately 
rejected because they felt Congress would fight it to the 
end and because Commerce Secretary Hoover thought it would 
be dangerous for America to become Germany's only 
d 't 39 ere i or. 
It was because of these pressures that the Republicans 
sought alternative methods to carry on diplomacy. Initially 
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Hughes sought an international committee of businessmen to 
determine the German capacity to pay. This was unacceptable 
to the French and British without a reduction in debts. 
Eventually the administration was able to negotiate a 
scaling down of the British debt (payment over sixty-two 
years and interest from 3 to 3.5%) which Congress agreed to 
in light of increasing prosperity after the recession of 
1921. The Republicans would get their committee of experts, 
but this corporatist scheme received its impetus from the 
conflict between the executive and legislative branch over 
economic policy in Europe. 
The debt cancellation issue was strongest from 1918 to 
1923 and probably reached its height in 1920, when a 
memorandum was signed by forty-four prominent members of 
banking houses and chambers of commerce which called for 
debt cancellation consideration. 40 That the debts were 
eventually scaled down may have been due to a fear that 
terms that were too strict would result in repudiation, but 
the Congressional War Debt Commission was never clear on its 
policy: it was not comprehensive and merely reduced interest 
(even though the overall effect was to reduce the debt by 
over 40%).
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Both sides, the bankers and congressional 
leaders tried to use public opinion on their side, but Joan-
Hoff Wilson believed that public opinion was not as big a 
factor as these leaders thought it was: the war-debt issue 
was simply not a high priority with the public. 42 
26 
Michael Hogan, argued against the old view of history 
as very short-sighted; he believed there was continuity 
between the Republicans and Wilson and that the United 
States did react to the reparation-debt problem before the 
Ruhr crisis. In addition he went beyond the new history to 
say that cooperation between Great Britain and the United 
States was greater than any rivalry between the two.
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In 
his view the debt restructuring (lowering of the interest 
rate and lengthening the schedule of payments) with Britain 
was very significant. It helped to overcome first obstacle 
to cooperation, especially since Britain passed on some of 
its savings to other debtors. In addition it began a trend 
toward finding a model for European stability. 44 He found 
evidence that the British and American bankers were also in 
agreement; the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, headed by 
Benjamin Strong, and the Bank of England, headed by Montagu 
Norman, both felt that banks should stay above politics. He 
cited the cooperation on the private level of the 
reconstruction loan to Austria in 1923, which was requested 
by the British and for which the House of Morgan helped 
. th . b k f t. . . 45 organize o er American an s or par icipation. 
Charles s. Maier felt Germany was also moving toward a 
corporatist scheme because of the failure of German 
parliamentary politics to achieve consensus. 46 With the 
weakening of parliamentary influence, interest groups 
emerged and bargained. Maier identified the most important 
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as labor, which was stronger after the war, the cartels, and 
the ministries of the federal government. The turmoil 
caused by the acceptance of terms further weakened the 
government, which, under Chancellor Wirth, sought 
equilibrium. Conservative elements, such as the banking 
houses, refused to join in a coalition government with the 
Social Democrats. Tax questions were central to the whole 
problem; they had to eliminate the deficit or watch the 
floating debt rise, which would drive the value of the mark 
down further, making the transfer problems worse. The 
conflict between the Social Democrats and the industrialists 
was at the root of the problem; the government simply did 
not enjoy enough widespread support to tax as heavily as it 
needed to, which made the budgetary problems worse and 
angered the French. 
The strength of industry could be seen in its ability 
to turn back tax proposals, such as the "seizure of real 
values" (Erfassung der Sachwerte), which meant to take 20% 
of all stocks and bonds. The Social Democrats backed down 
on this as they also had to on a 20% corporation tax and an 
ineffectual 4% property tax. 47 The Reichsverband der 
Deutschen Industrie was a strong influence. In July of 
1921, Wirth invited fifteen prominent business leaders to 
help come up with a plan to raise foreign currency. They 
decided to pledge some assets in order to secure a large 
foreign loan if the government would drop their socialist 
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tax proposals. They also wished to see Gustav Streseman's 
People's Party (DVP) in the government. Many circumstances 
seemed to conspire against the government in 1921-22: the 
loss of part of Upper Silesia to Poland, Morgan and the Bank 
of England turning down the loan proposal, a railroad 
strike, and emergency legislation which followed the 
assassination of Matthias Erzberger, who had served as 
Finance Minister for the Social Democrats. 48 This was 
followed in June of 1922 by the assassination of Foreign 
Minister Walter Rathenau, an act which prompted the passage 
of a law ''for the protection of the Republic", as even the 
political right grew apprehensive at the spread of 
lawlessness. 49 Wirth's government wanted a moratorium on 
the reparations payments in 1922 as a new crisis brewed. 
The British and the French were growing further apart 
in how hard-line they behaved toward Germany. Britain 
wanted fiscal reform before any loan, France wanted 
guarantees of payment, such as customs receipts, Germany 
wanted a guarantee of a loan before any fiscal reform. It 
seemed that only the United States could break the deadlock 
by some form of debt cancellation, but with the creation of 
the War Debt Commission under congressional control this 
d . . bl 50 seeme imposs1 e. Hoover seemed to go along with Morgan 
in wanting pledges of fiscal reform before making any loans 
and American bankers did not wish to go against the 
British. 51 But neither the British nor the Americans would 
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take the initiative while Germany and France were driven 
further apart by the pressure of the nationalist element in 
their respective domestic political situations. In America 
however, sentiment was turning toward some kind of 
involvement to bring about a solution. The American 
ambassador to Germany, Alanson Houghton, wrote to Hughes 
expressing the necessity for action, otherwise, "the 
Bolshevik tide will sweep restlessly to the Atlantic. This 
. h . " 52 is not mere r etor1c . 
30 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DAWES PLAN AND APOLITICAL DIPLOMACY 
The crisis of 1921-1922 turned to disaster in 1923 with 
the French invasion and occupation of the Ruhr district, 
Germany's most important industrial region. This action, 
which began in January, and lasted for about nine months, 
would stimulate the formation of the experts committee to 
deal with the reparations problem. The French government of 
Raymond Poincare, despite the opposition of Great Britain, 
took this move in response to the failure of Germany to keep 
up on its deliveries of coal and telephone poles. Germany 
was declared in default of its reparations obligations. The 
French thought this would guarantee payment as well as put 
them in a dominant position in Europe regarding industrial 
strength. Previously, they had provided iron ore to 
Germany, while Germany had provided coal to France. 
Cooperative cartel arrangements had been discussed by 
various industrialists, such as Hugo Stinnes, but this would 
now give the French control. 1 The Germans responded by 
stopping reparations payments and beginning a strategy of 
passive resistance, which slowed production to such an 
extent that it had very serious ramifications not only for 
the stability of the German mark, but also the French franc, 
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which was weakened by enforcement efforts. 
The Ruhr occupation not only separated a key part of 
Germany from the rest of the country, but the government's 
financial support of the resistance through printing more 
money was a major factor in the hyper-inflation that 
destroyed the currency. A coalition government, with 
Stresemann as Chancellor, finally ended the passive 
resistance in September. At this point, Stresemann allowed 
the Ruhr industrialists to make their own reparations 
agreements, evidence of what Maier called the corporatist 
development in Germany. 2 Stresemann incurred the wrath of 
the Nationalists, who felt he gave in to the Social 
Democrats. The inflation was also due to a weak government 
which did not have the power to tax sufficiently, a problem 
the Nationalists contributed to, though they blamed the 
Allies for everything. At this point, Maier felt the Weimar 
government was a mere broker for the interests of business, 
which was trying to arrange for foreign loans, labor, which 
wanted changes such as protection against excessive hours, 
and agriculture, which wanted an abolition of the 
. h . t 3 in eritance ax. Local governments in the Ruhr and 
Rhineland further compromised the authority in Berlin by 
carrying on separate negotiations with France. 4 
On December 29, 1922, Secretary of State Hughes had 
suggested, in a speech, that the reparations problem could 
be addressed by a unbiased committee of experts, with 
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American participation. American policy makers, wary of 
constraints posed by Congress as well as skeptical over the 
possible effects of direct involvement, wanted to direct the 
course of events through economic intervention. They felt 
they could do this either through regulating and directing 
loans or creating favorable debt settlements. 5 
Evidence of United States reluctance to get involved 
and of simultaneous concern over the developments in Europe 
is clear in the correspondence of Secretary Hughes 
throughout 1923. He expressed concern but was reluctant to 
commit to involvement. Hughes said that opinion in the 
United States was divided between sympathy for devastated 
France and belief that the occupation would prevent Germany 
from ever being able to pay: not only would their resistance 
lead to further sanctions, but German credit would suffer 
and they would never be able to export sufficiently to meet 
obligations. 6 Hughes also "felt that in all probability 
there would have to be some preliminary process of 
investigation in order to determine upon a satisfactory 
plan." Impartial experts examining the matter would prevent 
the type of governmental inquiry which through its 
partiality would be bound to fail. 7 Germany's financial 
capacity had to be determined and her credit restored. 
Stabilization of the German currency was essential to any 
solution, and this would most likely have to involve foreign 
loans. 
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The British pressed the Americans to take some action. 
The British Charg~ Chilton wrote to Hughes, "unity of 
thought which either renders common action possible or will 
be successful in finding an early solution appears to be 
lacking among the European powers • failing such action, 
not only Germany but Europe seems to be drifting into 
economic disaster. In the circumstances, His Majesty's 
Government have for long entertained the belief that the 
cooperation of the United States Government is an essential 
condition of any real advance towards settlement" 
Furthermore, "the solution of the European problem is of 
direct and vital concern to her if for no other reason than 
because the question of inter-allied debt is involved 
therein." 8 Chilton said they would welcome either an 
official or unofficial delegation. 
Hughes expressed the government's desire to take part 
in such a conference, but under certain conditions: it would 
have to be advisory: "not for the purpose of binding 
governments who would naturally be unwilling to pledge their 
acceptance in advance", the "essential difference" between 
reparations and Allied war-debts would have to be 
maintained, and finally, that "the Government of the United 
States is not in a position to appoint a member of the 
Reparation Commission inasmuch as such an appointment cannot 
be made without the consent of the Congress. The Secretary 
of State has no doubt, however, that competent American 
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citizens would be willing to participate in an economic 
inquiry 11 . 9 Hughes wanted to involve the United States, but 
in a way that Congress could not hinder the action and in a 
way that would not commit the United States but would 
contribute to a solution to the economic problems of Europe 
which affected the United States to a large extent. He 
would be conducting diplomacy with private citizens, 
representatives of the American financial community. 
The French were also looking for a way to involve the 
United States as their financial situation had deteriorated 
under the effects of occupation. But they wanted to "keep 
within the limits of the Treaty of Versailles", which 
allowed, under paragraph 7, Annex 11, Part VIII, the 
Reparation Commission "could designate a committee of 
experts to give their advice and they could ask the 
cooperation of American experts. 1110 They were careful to 
specify however, that this committee should not be as widely 
encompassing as the British wanted it to be, nor should it 
"encroach upon the powers of the Reparation Commission. 1111 
There was also a disagreement as to whether the reparations 
amount fixed on May 1, 1921 was to stand. Hughes pushed the 
idea that nothing should be set, that each government should 
have the right to reject or accept the findings of the 
committee, but to stipulate conditions beforehand would 
defeat the purpose. 12 Hughes was in essence rejecting the 
French terms. 
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The French eventually gave in to the flexibility 
requested by Hughes. Hughes then put forth the 
administration's view that they wanted unofficial 
participation (to avoid the Senate's confirmation right 
under the Treaty of Berlin). He also wanted Charles G. 
Dawes (former supply chief to the American Expeditionary 
Force and current president of the Central Trust Company of 
Illinois) invited to participate as one of the experts.13 
The Reparation Commission formally extended an invitation to 
Dawes and Owen D. Young (chairman of the board of General 
Electric and the Radio Corporation of America) on December 
21, 1923. A statement was released to the press that Dawes 
and Young "have been invited by the Reparation Commission to 
sit as members of an expert committee ... as private 
citizens without instructions and without the obligation of 
making reports except to Reparation Commission." 14 They did 
not really need instructions from the government however, 
because they also believed a reparations settlement would 
help stabilize Germany and help Europe recover, and this 
would help the United States. 15 Hughes did meet with Dawes, 
Young, and Henry M. Robinson (president of the First 
National Bank of Los Angeles), the third delegate, for two 
hours before they left for Europe, but they already agreed 
on their goals. He did provide them with documents and 
statistics and the services of economic advisor Arthur N. 
Young, who would not sit on any committees.
16 
Secretary of 
Commerce Hoover provided the delegation with similar 
assistance. As for the President, he told them, "just 
remember you are Americans." 17 
The main purpose of the conference was to determine 
Germany's capacity to pay and the experts wanted to remove 
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reparations from politics as much as possible and base them 
on economic realities, which they hoped would in turn 
eradicate the instability brought about by the War and its 
consequences. 18 To accomplish this, a stable currency and a 
balanced budget would be necessary in Germany. The critical 
factor would be the balance of payments: the total amount 
could not be raised completely from internal sources because 
transfer problems would occur. This meant they needed to 
raise funds from exports. But special arrangements had to 
be made thus a special bank had to be set up in which 
Germany would deposit funds in a reparation account for 
allied creditors. They stuck to economic questions and tried 
to steer away from the occupation question, partly to 
appease the French and gain their support for the plan.
19 
Further stipulations were that the Reichsbank would become 
independent of the German government, that the total 
obligation would not be fixed (annual payments would be 
determined), and that certain industries, including the 
railroads, would be mortgaged. By February, Dawes could 
write, "from this time on, I cease to worry'', thinking the 
20 worst was over. 
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But finding a compromise amount that satisfied both the 
French and the Germans proved difficult. Young eventually 
called on American Ambassador to Germany Alansen Houghton 
for help and a plan was finally reached in which payments 
after the first five years would be tied to a prosperity 
index. A foreign loan of 800 million gold marks to pump up 
the economy and help restore gold reserves was also a major 
part of the plan. A Reparations Agent would be in charge of 
transferring funds, about half of which would come from 
internal taxation and the rest from the mortgage bonds on 
G . d 21 erman in ustry. All of this, it was hoped would 
safeguard stabilization and revive Germany economically. 
But as Dawes recognized, the plan would not only have to 
appeal to "the conservative judgement of individuals 
expected to invest in a preferred loan", the bankers, but 
also the public and the governments involved, as well as the 
Reparations Commission. 22 So as much as Hughes and the 
Republicans wished it could be done, taking the reparations 
issue out of politics proved impossible. 
The ability of the financial experts (the "unofficial 
diplomats"), especially the bankers, to influence if not 
make foreign policy was very evident in the proceedings 
which led to the approval of the Dawes Plan. The whole plan 
was quite dependent on the loan and future investment in 
Germany. The bankers were very worried about the impact of 
the instability in the Ruhr on future lending. Thus J.P. 
Morgan insisted that the Allied governments agree not to 
intervene in Germany's ability to repay, which was a de 
facto revision of the Versailles Treaty. 23 Morgan exerted 
further leverage over the French by granting them 
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100 million dollars in credit to prop up the franc as an 
inducement to agree to the plan. As Houghton explained, 
"England and America have the franc in their control and can 
probably do what they want with it." 24 Nationalist 
opposition to the plan was strong in France, as it was in 
Germany, for differing reasons, but the more hard-line 
Poincare government was voted out and replaced by one led by 
the leftist Edouard Herriot, who approved the Dawes Plan. 25 
A conference was set up in London to put the plan into 
action. British Prime Minister Ramsey McDonald wanted the 
United States to send an offical delegation to the 
conference. Wishing to avoid the appearance of offical 
participation in European affairs, the administration 
originally backed off. Soon after, however, President 
Coolidge announced that the United States would accept the 
British invitation, "for the purpose of dealing with such 
matters as affect the interests of the United States and for 
purposes of information." 26 British bankers, such as 
Montagu Norman, head of the Bank of England, were also 
active in both trying to make sure the British got a fair 
share of German trade and also in trying to influence the 
choice of the official Reparations Agent. More 
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specifically, they wanted the position to go to someone who 
would represent the interests of the Anglo-American banking 
community rather than French or American political 
. 27 interests. 
At the London conference, the Americans were 
represented by bankers, such as Thomas Lamont and J.P. 
Morgan, as well as government officials such as Treasury 
Secretary Mellon, Ambassador Houghton, and Hughes. Hughes 
was supposedly there unofficially but exerted great pressure 
on the French to accept the plan or United States economic 
and diplomatic support could cease. 28 He knew the French 
were in need of loans for currency stabilization. The whole 
process was difficult because it involved dealing with 
Germany as an equal again, something the Allies were still 
reluctant to do. The governments as well as the financiers 
had to be satisfied for the whole thing to work. Ambassador 
to Britain, Clark Kellogg, played a key role in getting the 
French and Germans to agree to a settlement which would free 
the Ruhr within a year. 29 
The issue of who would become the Agent General for 
Reparations revolved around the political outlook of the 
choice. "It developed during meeting that there was 
unanimous desire, with Governments also agreeing, for 
appointment of an American as Agent General." 30 After Young 
turned the position down and the administration turned down 
the choice of Norman Davis as too associated with the 
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Democratic Party, the former undersecretary in the Treasury 
Department and liaison between Morgan and the government, S. 
Parker Gilbert, became a candidate agreeable to both the 
bankers and the administration. The bankers' role at the 
conference was influential and probably more pro-German than 
the State Department; "The bankers were fighting the German 
battles better than they could do it themselves" wrote 
Kellogg. 31 But this was necessary for the fulfillment of 
the whole plan as it rested on the 200 million dollar loan 
that the United States and Allied bankers agreed to make. 
Another issue that prompted official United States 
involvement, was the issue of American claims against the 
former Central Powers and the cost of the American army of 
occupation. During the negotiations, Hughes had instructed 
the Ambassador in France to inform Dawes and Young that the 
United States would disapprove any settlement which did not 
take into account American claims while providing for the 
claims of others. 32 The issue was allowed to sit however, 
as United States officials decided the time was not right at 
that point in the negotiations to interject American claims. 
This was complicated by the fact that American claims would 
not come under the Versailles Treaty as the claims of the 
Allies would, but under the separate Treaty of Berlin. This 
meant that they could not have a representative on the 
Reparations Commission (without the consent of the Senate). 
They were able, however, to secure an American as the 
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Reparation Agent General. 
In October, the administration decided it was time to 
press for claims. Hughes told Ambassador Kellogg in London 
to inform the British that "no facilitation of their 
proceedings in the future can be expected from the U.S. 
unless they deal fairly with U.S. claims. 1133 British 
officials did not take this well, believing the American 
claims settlement with Germany was harder on the Germans 
than the Allies claim settlement had been, and also because 
they felt caught between the American demands for debt 
payments and the French attempts to work themselves out of 
payments to Britain. 34 In January 1925, Ambassadors Herrick 
35 and Kellogg were eventually able to work out an agreement. 
The Dawes Plan was a beginning point for the 
reconstruction of Europe and solid evidence of the 
collaboration of business and government in attempting to 
solve what were obviously economic problems and, not so 
obvious to some, political problems. The State Department 
might have acknowledged the political nature of the whole 
process if it were not for the prevailing mood of the 
country and Congress, both of which were pessimistic about 
involvement in Europe. So it was that the policy begun by 
the Dawes Plan drifted away from coordination and toward a 
loan policy that was increasingly out of control and 
reckless. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE LOAN POLICY: COORDINATION GONE AWRY 
On October 10, 1924, bankers from the United States and the 
Allied nations arranged a loan of 200 million dollars to 
Germany to get the German economy going again so that they 
could make their reparations payments. This was the act 
that put the Dawes Plan into motion and began what would 
become a flood of loans to Germany over the next few years. 
Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover led the way, with the 
State and Treasury Departments in agreement, in trying to 
exert pressure on European governments to sign debt 
agreements and used the threat of an embargo on private 
loans to get these nations, France, Italy, and Belgium in 
particular, to reduce military spending and balance their 
budgets. 1 At the same time, Benjamin Strong, Governor of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was using similar 
pressure to make European governments push inflation down 
and balance their budgets. He told German leaders that the 
attitude of American financiers "would be very much governed 
by the degree to which confidence was felt in political 
conditions. 112 This had a direct impact on German Foreign 
Minister Gustav Stresemann's desire to gain a security pact. 
This realization that security was a prerequisite for 
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economic recovery pushed European governments toward the 
Locarno agreements, which were reached in October 1925. 
The Locarno Treaties established the western boundaries 
of Germany where they were after Versailles and also called 
for the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Germany would 
also become a member of the League of Nations, but 
Stresemann was able to gain the concession that Germany 
would be freed from having to take part in sanctions that 
might be imposed under article 16 of the League covenant. 
This concession meant that the Germans would not have to 
jeopardize their relationship with Russia by taking part in 
sanctions that might force them into fighting Russia or into 
allowing French troops to go through Germany to fight 
R 
. 3 ussia. British Foreign Minister Austin Chamberlain was 
concerned about keeping British commitments to a minimum and 
thus providing a moderating force against French demands. 
The result was a lack of commitment to guarantees regarding 
the German borders in the east. The Treaty made the 
possibility of another Ruhr episode virtually impossible. 
Troops were evacuated from the Ruhr as well as the right 
bank of the Rhine in the summer of 1925 and in December 
Allied troops left the first occupation zone on the left 
bank. Though all of this failed to satisfy a majority of 
Germans, it appeared that a political settlement to 
accompany the D3wes Plan h3d taken effect. 
The impact of American intervention was not lost on 
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Stresemann, who commented, "the whole question of the 
reconstruction of Europe cannot be settled without America", 
nor British Ambassador to Germany Viscount D' Abernon, who 
said, "In all the more important developments in Germany 
during post-war years, American influence has been 
decisive." Without American advice, agreement and approval, 
"the whole course of policy would be altered." 4 This was 
strong evidence that America was making a great political 
impact even though it was refusing to make political 
commitments. It was the impact of American finance that 
influenced political decisions. 
The American government, especially Commerce Secretary 
Hoover, sought to exert some control over these financial 
influences. Up to this point in history, there was no real 
precedent in either the United States or in other countries 
for loan control, though by 1920, voluntary controls over 
loans to underdeveloped areas, such as Latin America, 
Russia, and China had been accepted. 5 But Hoover began to 
push for systematic control over the foreign loan policy. 
That they were never able to attain it was one of the most 
significant facts in the development of modern American 
economic foreign policy, according to Joan Hoff-Wilson. 6 
Hoover met with Harding, Hughes, Mellon, and banking 
representatives Thomas Lamont and Milton Ailes, and decided 
that the government should be informed so that "it might 
express itself regarding the loans." The administration was 
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concerned because some loans were starting to be used for 
military purposes in Europe and the government had no policy 
to examine or restrict this. Thus Hoover wanted approval 
powers because first, the banks would go to the government 
when trouble arose, secondly, the banks should use the 
information and advice the government could offer, and 
third, he didn't want loans used for military purposes, for 
balancing budgets or to bolster inflationary currencies. 7 
The bankers, especially Thomas Lamont, representing the 
House of Morgan, which had provided a large share of the 
American portion of the Dawes loan, over half of which was 
American, and Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank, opposed any federal control. Strong felt 
control would "influence foreign governments in their 
domestic policies." He also claimed the government would 
not know where to draw the line between good loans and bad 
ones. 8 This may have been true, but uncontrolled loans 
would have the same effect in the second half of the 1920's. 
The bankers also would look to the government if things went 
sour~ they wanted protection without control. 
Aftei the Dawes Plan, American money began to pour into 
Germany. American finance had made the commercialization of 
reparations bonds attractive to foreign investors. The 
bonds became even more attractive when the Federal Reserve 
Bank lowered its discount rate from 4.5 to 3 percent. In 
Germany, the cities, which had become agents for social 
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change under the Weimar Republic, became particularly 
attractive to investors because they became debt free after 
their original bonds were rendered worthless by the 
inflation. In addition, under new provisions being worked 
out, the local governments were not responsible for 
collecting taxes but were responsible for carrying out 
welfare programs. 9 Under these conditions, local governments 
became increasingly willing to spend while they did not have 
to account for it. There was political pressure to increase 
social spending during recessionary periods, like the winter 
of 1925-1926. Resentment by industry because of the amount 
of loan money the cities were getting caused further 
political division between the Social Democrats, who headed 
many local governments, and industry, which aligned itself 
with the Nationalists. The largest problem was, under the 
Dawes Plan, governments were supposed to balance their 
budgets and pursue conservative fiscal policy. This was 
made very difficult by the recession of 1925 which made 
governments want to spend to relieve social discontent. 
In Germany, the Finance Ministry was conservative, the 
Economics Ministry was in the middle, and the Labor Ministry 
was on the left. They all competed in areas which affected 
foreign policy because the link between domestic policy and 
reparations policy was based on the supply of foreign 
capital.lo The loans allowed freer spending but created 
danger as well. To help solve this problem, a new 
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Reichsbank was created which was more independent of the 
government and thus hopefully more financially responsible. 
Hjalmar Schacht was appointed head and he pursued a tight 
money policy. In this way both international and monetary 
restraints became very influential factors in German foreign 
policy. 
It was easy for Germany to stray from fiscally 
conservative policy however, because of the volume of loans. 
Over the next several years, the United States would put up 80% of 
the money borrowed by German public credit institutions, 75% 
of that borrowed by local governments, and 56% of that 
borrowed by German corporations. 11 Germany was the leading 
recipient of the 5.1 billion dollars that were lent overseas 
between 1925 and 1929 and the amount was twice as much as 
was needed to pay reparations. 12 This flood of loans 
worried some businessmen and Hoover, but the State and 
Treasury Departments did not feel the need to get involved. 
A related problem was arising because the Allies began to 
expect cash payments, but the reparations balances were not 
forthcoming and this created fear of a transfer crisis. 13 
Another worry was that the German states and cities 
were pledging assets for these loans that were also pledged 
to the Allies for reparations. 14 This bothered the State 
Department as well as Reichsbank President Schacht, who soon 
had the states and cities getting clearances for loans. The 
State Department never did demand any proof of these 
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clearances from United States banks however. 15 By 1927, the 
State Department was telling the German government to keep 
strict tabs on these loans but was not checking up on them 
itself.15 The problem was definitely coming to the 
attention of the Reparation Agent, S. Parker Gilbert, 
however, and he would become the key figure in trying to 
gain a measure of responsibility over the loan policy, while 
not officially representing the United States government. 
Hoover wanted to coordinate economic and political 
foreign policy through a policy of loan control, but he was 
defeated in this by both the bankers and the other forces in 
the administration and the government. In alliance with the 
manufacturers, represented by the National Foreign Trade 
Council, which included such firms as U.S. Steel, Standard 
Oil, Westinghouse, U.S. Rubber, and International Harvester, 
Hoover's Commerce Department tried to get a condition set on 
foreign loans which would stipulate that foreigners would 
have to spend a certain percent of their loans on American 
goods. 17 Opposition came from Harding, Coolidge, the 
Federal Reserve, Congress, and the Treasury and State 
Departments. Both Hughes and Frank B. Kellogg, who followed 
as Secretary of State, objected to the infringement on what 
they considered their prerogative, the making of foreign 
policy. Hoover, as the driving force behind the corporatist 
vision with his "associational" views, felt the government 
could have an informational and organizing role in helping 
. d t 18 in us ry. The bankers believed however, that industry 
would benefit from the loans regardless of the type of 
control Hoover wanted, because it would increase exports. 
Hoover eventually got his way to a certain extent when the 
State Department assumed responsibility for controlling 
foreign loans, but it was a very flimsy control; it never 
turned down a single loan in the 1920's despite continual 
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warnings from Reparations Agent Gilbert about German fiscal 
. 'b'l' 19 irresponsi i ity. 
Congress also came out against loan control after the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in 1925 and 
1927, and increasingly turned the public against it on the 
grounds that it could end up involving the United States 
militarily. Ironically, Hoover was against any armed 
intervention to protect loans, though Hughes and many 
bankers were for it. In this way, dissension and 
misunderstanding contributed to the lack of a coordinated 
policy on loan contro1. 20 The apparent prosperity of the 
period from 1925 to 1928, which saw very few defaults, 
seemed to lull many bankers and the State Department into a 
false sense of security. 
The State Department's attitude on loans was to defer 
to the the Beratungsstelle, the German federal loan approval 
board; concerning a loan to the Municipal Gas & Electric 
Corporation of Recklinghausen, Secretary of State Kellogg 
mentioned that "the Department would not wish to confront 
that body, before it passes upon particular loans, with a 
statement thereon of the Department's views. 1121 When the 
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German utility wrote to the Department requesting consent, 
Assistant Secretary Castle reiterated that approval of the 
Beratungsstelle was not required for corporation loans, and 
merely warned them: "In view of the large number and amount 
of offerings of German loans in the American market, the 
Department believes that American bankers should examine 
with particular care all German financing that is brought to 
their attention, with a view to ascertaining whether the 
loan proceeds are to be used for productive and self-
supporting objects that will improve directly or indirectly, 
the economic condition of Germany and tend to aid that 
country in meeting its financial obligations at home and 
abroad. 1122 He went on to mention that the German Federal 
authorities were against indiscriminate lending when the 
borrowers are German municipalities with unproductive 
purposes. He also warned that complications could arise 
"from possible future action by the Agent General and the 
Transfer Committee. 1123 
The attitude toward loans to municipalities did not 
seem to be much stricter. Concerning a loan of 10 million 
dollars for the Rhine-Ruhr Water Service Union of Essen, it 
was admitted that these were "corporate bodies of public 
character"; as with the Recklinghausen concern, the stock of 
prospective borrowers was partly owned by the municipality. 
56 
Yet Ambassador Jacob G. Schurman informed Kellogg that the 
Beratungsstelle did not have jurisdiction over this loan. 
Further confusion was evident regarding approval of city of 
Berlin and city of Frankfurt loans which had been approved 
"in principle" by the Beratungsstelle. 24 
Reichsbank President Schacht was very much in favor of 
loan control, along with Finance Minister Hans Luther. They 
wanted Germany to direct the loans, not America. Schacht 
felt only industrial loans would increase the German trade 
balance, which would stabilize the currency and help balance 
the budget. He wanted strict control over public loans but 
the states would not go along with this. Luther then 
persuaded Reich President Friedrich Ebert to impose 
emergency powers which would subject all state and city 
loans to Finance Ministry approval. The Reparations Agent 
Gilbert agreed with this move completely. 25 
Schacht and Luther both saw that tying American money 
to German prosperity, that is to private industry, would 
make America much more responsive to German economic welfare 
and even get them more interested in lowering reparations. 
If American finance could invest in German local 
governments, with the guarantee of repayment tied to tax 
receipts, they would have less incentive to worry about 
German prosperity. Furthermore, as Luther said, "the 
foreign lender will not have the same interest in the 
prosperity of our economy when his capital is insured by 
the public purse and the payments are not exclusively 
dependent on the prosperity of our economy . . If the 
guarantee of the public purse were to become a reality, we 
would soon become absolutely dependent on the foreign 
capital market." 26 
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The private loans were often not much more productive, 
but they were more politically acceptable in the mid-1920's. 
The conservatives increasingly attacked public spending, but 
local governments saw it as their only survival. Industry 
naturally wanted a larger slice of the loan pie and saw that 
as a way to combat socialism as well. This is what the 
American policy makers in both government and finance did 
not realize, that the political struggle within Germany was 
very much influenced by the direction of their capital. 27 
One large effect that the seemingly directionless flow 
of capital did have was to play havoc with German attempts 
to impose consistent monetary and fiscal policy. The 
security of the municipal bonds was so attractive to 
American investors, that money made it into the cities 
despite controls. By 1927, what Luther and Schacht had 
feared was coming true: American bankers were not responding 
to German economic needs, which at this point was new 
markets for expansion, but investing in dubious local 
projects like parks, hotels, and swimming pools. Top 
international bankers, like Lamont, grew very concerned 
about the actions of so many less cautious bankers. He 
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wrote to Hoover, "the manner in which certain American 
bankers have been scrambling for all sorts of loans in 
Europe is little less than scandalous, just because the bond 
market happens to be so excellent here just now that people 
can sell almost anything. 1128 
Still, the line between public and private was often 
blurred. Investment in the German public sector exceeded 
that in the private sector from 1924 to 1930, but many of 
the public investment went toward projects which included 
gas, electric, and transportation works, all infrastructure 
projects which benefited industry. 29 Furthermore, private 
firms competed for public contracts and cities such as 
Bremen solicited foreign capital which it made available to 
private industry. Nevertheless, this state "spending", or 
the socialist tendency that Schacht called "Kalte 
Sozialisierung", became an abstract target for the 
. . f h . bl. 30 conservative enemies o t e Weimar Repu ic. 
Conservative fiscal policy became very difficult to 
implement during the recession of 1925-26 however, as 
unemployment rose and conflicts over Germany's ability to 
pay reparations increased. Revisionist historiography of 
the last 20 years has generally held that Germany was able 
to pay reparations, based on its fiscal and monetary 
policy of 1925 and 1926. But the price they had to pay in 
domestic turmoil has also become an issue; it is not simply 
a question of ability to pay. Those who felt Germany was 
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not committed to paying reparations claim they didn't 
continue their policy of high taxation and lowered spending. 
As William C. McNeil writes, the problem lay in the 
realities which faced German policy makers and in the 
transfer difficulty which resulted from Germany's poor trade 
31 balance. 
The balance of trade was a crucial element. Since 
reparations had to be paid in gold or foreign currency, 
which could only be earned by a positive trade balance, 
German ability to export was essential to the working of the 
whole scheme set up by the Dawes Plan. The trouble was, the 
Allies didn't want trade deficits. For a while, in 1925 and 
1926, depression lowered national income, which reduced 
ability to import. This worked with a slight deflation to 
produce a better trade balance. But the unemployment and 
corresponding increase in social spending undermined this. 
Raising taxes and balancing the budget would involve heavy 
social costs. 
American tariff policy was harmful to the German trade 
balance and did not seem to be in concert with efforts made 
to restore German economic health through the Dawes Plan. 
The tariff was always a hot domestic political issue and 
usually a regional concern. The 1922 Fordney-McCumber 
tariff established a high tariff policy for the 1920's. The 
most-favored nation status was another aspect of trade 
policy that made reciprocity a feature of United States 
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trade agreements. Wilson and Harding had sought moderate 
tariffs and the Federal Tariff Commission was granted 
enlarged powers to deal with the abnormal post-war situation 
but throughout the decade protectionism won over. Pressure 
groups which represented specific small and medium size 
businesses were able to dominate the tariff hearings of the 
1920's. As Joan Hoff-Wilson pointed out, the tariff was a 
stopgap measure, and not a means of coherent policy to deal 
with the post-war European economic problems. 32 Though some 
flexibility was built in by section 315 of the Fordney-
McCumber tariff, whereby the President could raise or lower 
the rate to equalize it according to the domestic cost of 
production, this was seldom resorted to: only 5 of 38 duty 
changes under this provision that were approved by Harding 
and Coolidge actually lowered rates in the 1920's. 33 
Hoover, as President, had a nationalistic outlook as well. 
He appeared to be somewhat inconsistent in defending 
artifical restraints, high tariffs, while attacking foreign 
cartels. The State Department also did not discuss tariff 
duties at international conferences. The tariff issue would 
slowly build a wedge between big business and the executive 
and contribute to the breakup of the corporatist structure 
which had been developing in the 1920's. 
In this climate of economic nationalism, it was 
difficult for the Dawes Plan to be as effective as it might 
have been. It opened the door for loans which were 
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increasingly used to make up for what Germany could not gain 
through a favorable trade balance. The foreign loans were 
contributing to budget deficits. In this situation, the 
Reichsbank was caught in the middle, between the left, which 
wanted lower rates, and the right, which claimed the high 
domestic lending rates made Germany dependent on foreign 
capital. Schacht and Luther continually fought for fiscal 
responsibility, Luther claiming that "in terms of foreign 
policy, it is undoubtably impossible to present an 
unbalanced budget 11 • 34 Reparations Agent Gilbert supported 
Schacht in his conservative monetary policy, which earned 
him the wrath of Germans who resented his influence over the 
economy. In addition, the international bankers favored 
Schacht's policy. Schacht, in seeking fiscal conservatism, 
wanted to restrict the flow of foreign capital to Germany, 
which he believed encouraged fiscal irresponsibility. 
Gilbert also felt the reckless lending by many American 
bankers undermined efforts to gain stability and he worked 
to check this tendency, while at the same time defending the 
collection of reparations. The efforts of both Gilbert and 
Schacht seemed to be working as the Beratungsstelle and 
State Department stepped up their disapproval of excessive 
public borrowing; the German Advisory Board began 
effectively restricting loans in late 1927 and the State 
Department expressed strong objections to a loan of 30 
million dollars to the Prussian state government to cover 
budget deficits, under strong pressure from Gilbert. They 
later retreated however, and maintained it was the German 
Advisory Board's responsibility. This moved the German 
consul in Washington, Otto Kiep, to conclude: "neither in 
the Cabinet nor in the responsible departments (State 
Department, Treasury, Department of Commerce) led to an 
authoritative clarification and determination of the 
fundamentals of loan policy." 35 
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On October 10, 1927 Gilbert created still more 
resentment among German industry for his interference and 
uncertainty among American bankers with a highly publicized 
memo to the Reich Government, which claimed "severe economic 
reaction and depression if these tendencies are allowed to 
continue unchecked ... giving the impression that Germany 
is not acting with due regard to her reparation 
obligations." 36 Loans did begin to slow down in 1927 and 
Schacht lowered the Reichsbank's discount rate which 
encouraged domestic borrowing in Germany. But the transfer 
problem grew as the loans waned and Gilbert began to realize 
the transfer protection in the Dawes Plan was a weakness and 
in need of reform. Sentiment was growing for a new plan for 
the final settlement of reparations, especially with payment 
rising to 2.5 billion Reichsmarks in September of 1928. 
William C. McNeil called Gilbert arguably the most 
influential person in international finance in the last 
third of the 1920's. 37 Gilbert also operated in complete 
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independence from the United States government in carrying 
out the job of ensuring the flow of reparations payments. 
His policies had great effect however, on the attitude of 
the State Department and the bankers towards foreign 
loans and especially on the German economy. The United 
States government trusted Gilbert to represent the interests 
of the United States by representing the interests of 
American bankers and international finance. Schacht was 
also a relatively independent operator who influenced the 
direction of financial conservatism, but for different 
reasons. Gilbert sought the collection of reparations 
through fiscal and monetary conservatism, while Schacht 
sought to show that reparations could not be maintained, 
using the same conservative strategy. However, the lack of 
an effective loan control mechanism for most of the Dawes 
Plan period exposed the fragility of the settlement. The 
loans had created an illusion of prosperity in Germany that 
was based on extremely shaky ground politically. Division 
among the political right and left only grew worse, yet 
American policy makers in the government seemed oblivious to 
this effect of allowing finance to conduct foreign policy in 
the absence of a political mandate. Norman Davis called 
this diplomacy by capitalists "inadequate, undignified and 
cowardly. 1138 But Hughes explained the rationale for this 
strategy in 1924: "I may give it as my conviction that had 
we attempted to make America's contribution to the recent 
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plan of adjustment a governmental matter, we should have 
been involved in a hopeless debate, and there would have 
been no adequate action. We should have been beset with 
demands, objections, instructions. That is not the way to 
k . t . b . . . 1 .. 39 ma e an American con ri ution to economic reviva . 
German hope for a favorable final settlement in 1929 
was misplaced because it still depended on a reduction in 
the Allied war-debts, which the American Congress was still 
unwilling to go along with. It was not a matter for the 
bankers to decide and thus the corporatist foreign policy 
had its limits. Once again it would be a committee of 
experts that would meet to set up a final settlement and the 
United States representatives were Owen D. Young, and J. 
Pierpont Morgan. Once again this was unofficial diplomacy, 
though Young and Secretary of State Kellogg were in close 
communication about the proceedings. In fact Kellogg 
expressed strong opposition to certain elements of the 
negotiations, especially those that sought to separate 
reparations payments into two categories and thus tie them 
to Allied war-debts: "we will be collecting reparations from 
Germany in satisfaction of the allied debt to us . . the 
position taken by this government is being most effectively 
nullified . • The American delegates have failed to 
maintain the position consistently taken by their government 
and that their failure to do so may have unfortunate 
consequences in the future in so far as the protection of 
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America's interests are concerned." 40 This statement seems 
to reveal that the foreign policy collaboration was not in 
great harmony at this point. The administration in 
Washington still wanted no recognition of the connection 
between war-debts and reparations, while the financiers 
felt it was too obvious to ignore. Though they were not 
representing the government, Kellogg wanted them to act 
in the government's interest. The lack of recognition of 
the connection would be most harmful to Germany. 
The Young Plan replaced the Dawes Plan in 1930. It 
reduced payments from 2.5 billion marks to 1.7 billion 
annually, and only partially protected transfers. It also 
brought back limited lending, which had dried up 
considerably. 41 That America would not cancel the debt 
proved to be a major blow to democracy in Germany. The 
industrialists and conservatives wanted a much better 
settlement, the Reich government took the blame, and the 
split between the two would be final. The very next year, 
1930, would see huge success by the National Socialists, 
Hitler's party. As for American policy, they were able to 
maintain the lack of linkage between war debts and 
reparations and followed this illusion with a high tariff 
(Smoot-Hawley) in 1930, which Herbert Feis called the 
ultimate folly. 42 This shaky edifice would fall apart under 
the weight of the Great Depression. 
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CHAPTER V 
CORPORATISM UNDER STRESS: THE HOOVER YEARS 
President Hoover presided over American foreign policy 
during the critical period of the Depression's onset and the 
last years of the Weimar Republic. He continued the policy 
of treating economics and politics as two separate fields 
and this made his Moratorium proposal, his most vital 
contribution to dealing with the world economic problem, 
less effective than it could have been. Hoover also 
continued the policy of using unofficial diplomats, normally 
represented by the banking community, though their influence 
waned as the Depression went on. He also, as one of the 
original proponents, continued the policy of State 
Department approval of foreign loans. Under Hoover, this 
approval process seemed to be as shaky and confused as it 
previously had been. 
A loan proposal by the Swedish businessman Ivar Krueger 
provided a good example of the lack of effective control 
over loans to Germany. He wanted to loan the German 
government 125 million dollars in order to gain a monopoly 
of Germany's match industry in 1929, but he was in no 
position to loan this much money and so recruited the 
assistance of the American banking house of Lee, Higgenson 
1 and Company. 
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Kreuger also made the loan conditional on the Germans 
accepting the Young Plan for the revision of reparations, 
which the State Department was pushing for. 2 Reparations 
Agent s. Parker Gilbert voiced objections to not being 
consulted and he also wanted the State Department involved. 
He was very disappointed that George Murname, of Lee, 
Higginson and Company could give no account of how a 
majority of these credits were to be used. 3 Gilbert was 
pessimistic: "there is a real danger that new credits will 
simply relieve the Government from the pressure that 
otherwise exists to put its finances in order." Furthermore, 
he felt the money would result in new expenditures, allow 
the Germans to postpone reform and thus interfere with the 
Young Plan and the mobilization of reparations bonds. He 
was worried about "how far the German Government and other 
German public authorities are to be allowed to have recourse 
to the American market for the purpose of financing their 
budgetary deficits." 4 
Undersecretary of State Joseph P. Cotton, acting for 
Secretary Stimson, was unclear whether the loan was subject 
to State Department approval. He contacted Lee, Higginson 
and found that they "have no information to the effect that 
their agreement is in any way conditioned upon Department's 
approval", merely that they had discussed it with Schacht 
and the French. Cotton also mentioned in a later telegram 
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that presently "we are hardly in a position to close our 
markets to every request for capital from abroad. 115 Gilbert 
answered him by pushing him to take a stand and to be aware 
of the "political risks which necessarily remain until the 
new plan has gone into full operation." He also reiterated 
that he was "opposed to the present credit unless it is 
clearly and definitely understood that the funds are to be 
applied immediately to the retirement of existing debt. 116 
Answering Gilbert, Cotton appeared to want no responsibility 
for the matter of loan control: "I feel it would be unwise 
to oppose this loan, first, because it means going in and 
attempting to control German action to put through the Young 
Plan, which I deem inadvisable; second, because it is unwise 
to attempt to control such a foreign loan." He was clearly 
avoiding the issue of loan control. The loan was soon made. 
Furthermore, Ambassador Sackett in Berlin "did not want 
Embassy, if loan failed, suspected of interfering with 
German Government's financial plans." This perpetuated the 
situation of official diplomats staying out and allowing the 
banking representatives to handle diplomacy. 7 
The Young Plan loan was carried out in much the same 
fashion, with the bankers leading the way in establishing a 
loan of 300 million dollars, two-thirds of which would go to 
Germany's creditors and one-third of which would help 
Germany reduce budget deficits. 8 The reparations were 
commercialized by selling them as bonds, often in the 
American market. So here the bankers were not only 
putting the reparations on a commercial basis, but making 
foreign policy by intervening in German internal affairs 
(budget deficits). They were also making a de facto 
connection between war debts and reparations. Thomas 
Lamont, of the House of Morgan, wanted "the final 
liquidation of the War so far as the settlement of great 
economic questions is concerned and obviously it is is 
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greatly to the interest of American trade to have this great 
Reparations question settled." He also wanted Germany 
to be "taken effectively out of receivership; that the 
the heavy mortgage liens upon her railway and industries be 
abolished, and that she be put upon her honor to carry out 
her obligations. 119 They were attempting to privatize a 
political situation, that of Germany's war-caused obligation 
to the Allies. 
Just six months after the Young Plan loan had begun 
however, Germany wanted further adjustments. Chancellor 
Heinrich Bruning met with American Ambassador Sackett in 
Berlin in December of 1930 and suggested a conference in 
which Hoover and the United States would take the lead. He 
also wanted an end to the separation of economics and 
politics: "if this economic conference only dealt with 
purely economic questions, and was only attended by economic 
experts, in all probability an unsatisfactory outcome must 
be expected. The difficulty with all past efforts had been 
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that they had regarded the great related questions of 
disarmament, reparations, debt retirement, and international 
loan requirements as separate matters, leaving them to 
specialists. We must get away from this method: above all, 
for me a complete understanding with France was the truly 
decisive goal for a pacification of the politics of the 
whole world", but he feared direct negotiations with France 
would be hampered by French internal politics. 10 Ambassador 
Sackett agreed with Bruning's appraisal and called on Hoover 
to go along with the conference, but Hoover was not in favor 
of a conference at this time because of his preoccupation 
with domestic problems. 
At this point, Young advised Hoover that debts and 
reparations should be reduced by at least twenty percent, 
which made Lee, Higginson nervous about their possible 
overextension. 11 Both Schacht and Luther were, in the 
spring 1931, calling reparations the cause of the 
Depression. Bruning was pleading for moderation, but in May 
the Nazis and the Communists made gains in provincial 
elections, causing a further polarization of the political 
situation in Germany. 
A serious blow to German hopes for recovery occurred 
when French pressure prevented a customs union between 
Austria and Germany. The French applied financial pressure 
by threatening to withdraw their 200 million dollars in 
short term securities. German and Austrian attempts to 
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borrow elsewhere began a panic which eventually led to the 
collapse of Austria's largest bank, the Creditanstalt. By 
June, this had prompted German President Paul von Hindenburg 
to appeal to Hoover to intervene. 12 The situation for 
Hoover was made more serious by the fact that some Central 
and South American countries were also having a hard time 
meeting their short term loan obligations and a potential 
total default of 4 billion dollars seriously threatened 
large American banks. 13 
Secretary of State Stimson was for some form of 
cancellation of the war debts, while Treasury Secretary 
Mellon came out against such a plan. 14 Hoover came down in 
the middle, though he may have tended to favor some 
cancellation if not for the fact that an election year was 
h
. 15 approac ing. Ambassador Sackett in Berlin convinced him 
that a financial collapse in Central Europe was imminent and 
Thomas Lamont suggested that the United States defer on the 
f . . l 16 payment o princip e. Hoover was now seriously 
considering a moratorium on intergovernmental debts, despite 
claims by the Treasury Department that he did not have 
congressional authority for such a move. Between June 9 and 
June 15, Stimson and Treasury Undersecretary Ogden Mills 
consulted with several key bankers, including Young, 
Gilbert, and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Chairman 
George Harrison, and they all decided that the time was 
right for a moratorium. 17 Hoover then conferred with key 
members of Congress from both parties and gained enough 
pledges of support to go ahead with his plans for a 
moratorium on debt payments. 
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Though Hoover was still relying to a certain extent on 
advice from the bankers, they were not as prominent as they 
had been in actively formulating policy. Certainly the 
Depression in general was a turning point for corporatist 
development, but during this particular crisis in the middle 
of 1931, Hoover increasingly relied on his department heads, 
especially Stimson, Mellon, and Mills, to formulate policy. 
Furthermore, a Moratorium on debt payments was also subject 
to congressional approval, no matter what the bankers 
advised. In his memoirs, Hoover claimed that he was 
motivated more over concern for the international economy 
than concern for the specific interests of New York banks. 18 
But these banks did hold over 500 million dollars in short 
term credits to Germany and a default would have serious 
consequences. Hoover wanted a psychological boost to 
result from his Moratorium as well as an easing of the 
credit situation. Another motivation was to act before 
Germany did. 19 As early as March of 1931, Bruning had 
decided to seek an end to the reparations payments. 20 
Stimson was in constant communication with the British, 
especially Prime Minister MacDonald, Ambassador Ronald 
Lindsey, and Bank of England chief Montagu Norman. They, 
along with Ambassador Sackett kept him informed that Bruning 
and Foreign Minister Julius Curtius were close to an 
announcement of a Young Plan moratorium of their own. 
Stimson informed the British of the American plan for a 
moratorium, which angered Hoover since it had not yet been 
approved in the United States. 21 Rather than using the 
bankers as unofficial diplomats, Hoover was now using the 
department heads. He sent Treasury Secretary Mellon to 
England to consult with the British about the proposed 
Moratorium and he decided to go with the Moratorium after 
receiving Mellon's report. Originally against the plan, 
Mellon now urged a two year Moratorium, which both Stimson 
and Mills agreed with. Hoover eventually decided on a one 
year deferment of war debt payments and made his formal 
announcement on June 20, 1931. 
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Whether he intended to or not, Hoover had intervened 
significantly in the political affairs of Europe in general 
and Germany in particular. Though it may still have been 
financial diplomacy, a moratorium at this point was critical 
to Bruning's political survival. Unfortunately for the 
Americans, a failure to adequately consult the French 
undermined the effect of the Moratorium. 
Stimson called the Moratorium the "boldest and most 
constructive step taken by the United States in its dealings 
with Europe since 1918." 22 The total indebtedness to the 
United States had been about 10 billion dollars. This was 
reduced by about 40 percent in the mid-1920's. By 1931, 
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Germany would owe about 400 million on their next payment, 
about two-thirds of which would go to the United States and 
most of the rest to France as the other net creditor. Great 
Britain received about as much in reparations as they had to 
pay in war debts. 23 So the problem was, as Stimson saw it, 
that success of the plan depended on the French as well; all 
the debts had to be covered by the Moratorium. Hoover 
however, was afraid of the diplomatic haggling and publicity 
that might result, and thereby jeopardize the whole plan. 
The French were not informed until the day before the 
announcement. Stimson recorded in his diary the response of 
French Ambassador Paul Claudel: he said that "it was 
wonderful, that he had no idea the President would go so 
far".24 Nonetheless, the French were not happy about the 
lack of consultation. MacDonald and Stimson felt prior 
negotiation might have been fatal to the plan and the 
financial situation because of the reaction to negotiations 
in both the U.S. Congress and on the part of French 
extremists on the right. Both at the time and in 
retrospect, Stimson saw the main problem of the day as the 
lack of flexibility: "Time after time the issues which 
divided the statesmen of the great powers were those on 
which they themselves would have been happy to reach 
agreement - and would have found agreement easy - if they 
had not feared a hostile verdict from public opinion at 
home. 1125 
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The French were upset, not only because of the lack of 
consultation, but also because they felt the reparations 
might be officially ended at this point. They saw the main 
beneficiaries as the American and British banks as well as 
the German government. This was because the French had 
already removed much of their credits from Germany after the 
elections of September 1930, in which the Nazis made their 
huge breakthrough. The French did realize however, that an 
American action would be preferable to a German declaration 
on debts and reparations. Secretary Mellon and Ambassador 
Walter Edge worked hard to convince the French and were 
26 eventually successful. 
The corporatist model was still operating at this point 
as private interests were still very powerful in matters of 
finance and trade. George L. Harrison of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank influenced and helped guide Stimson in 
financial matters and the bankers were very instrumental in 
helping Hoover gain the "Standstill'' agreements in July of 
1931, by which the governments and central banks of the 
United States, Great Britain, and France agreed to stop 
liquidating short term German credits. 27 But the 
Departments, especially State and Treasury were increasingly 
responsible for the actual policies and would become more so 
as the influence of the bankers waned during the deepest 
part of the Depression in the early 1930's. 
Another factor that may have been tipping the balance 
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away from corporatism, was the recognition that political 
normalcy was a prerequisite for economic normalcy. At the 
London Conference in July of 1931, where the details of the 
Moratorium were hammered out, it was agreed that the Bank 
for International Settlements should form a committee to 
deal with the German credit problem. The bankers formed the 
"Basel Committee", but they realized that financial 
stability and the restoration of German credit would depend 
on political cooperation, as the Layton-Wiggen Report issued 
by the Conference emphasized: "Until relations between 
Germany and other European Powers are firmly established on 
a basis of sympathetic co-operation and mutual confidence 
and an important source of internal political difficulty for 
Germany thereby removed, there can be no assurance of 
continued and peaceful economic progress." The report went 
on to state a second problem, "the increase in a snowball 
fashion" of Germany's foreign debt. They claimed that 
"action which lies outside our province must first be taken 
before any long-term German bonds, however well secured, can 
be sold." 28 The limits of financial diplomacy were becoming 
very apparent. 
Hoover now had to face the question of what should the 
administration do, regarding Europe, if the financial 
community would no longer contribute to European 
stabilization. Hoover asked George Harrison, head of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to help convince bankers 
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involved with loans to Germany to extend new credits. 
However, all but one said they would maintain only their 
existing credits and not grant new ones. Thomas Lamont, for 
example, said Germany was acting irresponsibly and thus 
there was no reason for new credits. 29 The bankers would 
not solve the problem this time; they had gone far enough 
and could do no more, according to both Lamont and Owen 
Young. 3° Corporatism was severely strained in July of 1931. 
The issue of French security was bound up with the 
economic problem. France wanted only assurances that the 
United States would not interfere with any sanctions, but 
Hoover was still hesitant to make any foreign commitments. 
It was becoming evident that some new tactics would be 
needed and Hoover would eventually introduce them with 
American participation in the disarmament talks and with 
plans for an economic conference. But, for now, he moved 
only slowly in this direction. 
Historian Edward Bennett concluded that both the 
failure to consult the French over the Moratorium and the 
lack of a political settlement were critical factors. 31 It 
seems clear from this analysis that it was no longer 
possible, if it ever was, to influence events in Europe 
solely through financial mechanisms. Germany needed 
recognition as an equal among the great European powers and 
never got it. They never offered a lot in return however, 
and seemed usually to want to use their relationship with 
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the United States to gain credits and reparations revision. 
France meanwhile, insisted on the Versailles status quo, an 
artificial superiority. The lack of support from the United 
States and Britain, evidenced by the Moratorium affair, 
reinforced this anxiety. 
The Moratorium was a bold attempt to deal positively 
with the financial problems facing Western Europe and the 
United States but it did not halt the crisis. By 1935, the 
German default rate on the Young Plan commercialized 
reparation payments was 99.6 percent. 32 The Bank for 
International Settlement's coordination of monetary policy 
through the central banks of the leading powers also came 
too late. The structure based on the private sector was 
collapsing and the governments could not rescue it at this 
time. Increasingly, private industry began to strike 
cartel-like deals to protect themselves, such as the export 
association formed by General Electric and Westinghouse in 
1931 which resulted in a monopoly on electrical parts. 33 
Incentives offered by foreign governments also led to 
investment abroad, especially in Latin America, and also in 
Germany, where agreements between German and American firms 
became common. 
Business internationalists had enjoyed the "new 
practical realism" of the unofficial conferences as opposed 
to the old diplomatic methods of the leading politicians. 
But this new method didn't take into account the necessary 
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political adjustments. Some, like Senator John Roberts and 
Norman Davis, felt this was an abdication of executive 
power. 34 Government promoted economic interests abroad but 
put the economic foreign policy in the hands of private 
individuals. In December of 1931, Hoover proposed to 
Congress a temporary readjustment in war debts to countries 
which needed it. They turned him down and the eventual 
result was repudiation of payments and a loss to the 
American taxpayer. Later, when Hoover tried to convince 
newly elected Franklin D. Roosevelt of the necessity of debt 
reduction, he was unsuccessful. But America was heavily 
involved in the affairs of Europe through the corporatist 
vision of American financial intervention. By the end of 
summer in 1931, the Journal of the American Bankers 
Association proclaimed, "the last vestige, the last 
pretense, of following Washington's advice to avoid European 
entanglements has been thrown aside . . Our isolation is 
at an end". 35 Despite this, the United States government 
would not completely cancel war debts that would soon go 
unpaid anyway, nor would they waver from the view that 
European leaders should solve their own political problems. 
Two major conferences were in the preparation stages in 
1932, in which this American perspective would surface. One 
was the London Economic Conference, in which F.D.R. would 
play the key role in the summer of 1933 and the other was 
the Geneva Disarmament Conference. 
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In preparation for the Disarmament Conference, 
Secretary of State Stimson told J. Pierrepont Moffat, the 
chief of Western European Affairs for the State Department, 
"the difficulties of the Disarmament Conference are largely 
a series of bilateral European problems" and "our chief 
interest, in the preparations for the Conference is to help 
the other nations in making advance preparations for the 
Conference." 36 This confirmed the view that the U.S. should 
not take a strong political role in European affairs. The 
United States army was not substantial enough to be a factor 
at the Conference but "when it came to the navies the 
guiding principle of our delegation must be that the 
superiority on the seas of the Anglo-Saxon nations must not 
be imperiled", in order to help preserve peace. 37 The 
American delegation was also hampered by Congress, which 
under the guidance of Senator Borah was threatening an end 
to the appropriation which supported the delegation. 38 
Hoover did propose to reduce arms by one-third, but it never 
happened. "The French are distinctly uneasy, and despite 
all denials, view the whole proposal as a shrewd move in the 
chess game of debts and reparations." 39 In the long run, 
the United States was not interested in proposals that would 
compromise security. However, the fact that Hoover was 
involving the U.S. in these two major conferences was an 
indication that the administration was changing tactics and 
no longer relying on committees of financial "experts". 
They would now involve high level statesmen and diplomats 
directly in Europe to work on essentially political 
problems. 
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The United States had played a role in disarmament 
talks in 1922 and 1930 in Washington and London, but had 
been primarily interested in questions of naval strength. 
According to Edward Bennett, domestic politics and a naive 
idealism were always at the forefront of American thinking 
and this blinded them to the reality of the influence of the 
balance of power equation that had dominated Europe. 40 
Accordingly, they adopted two approaches. The first idea, 
favored by Norman Davis, the chief delegate to the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference in 1932, was to make a dramatic 
proposal, which Hoover did, but which had no chance of 
acceptance by the French. The second was the decidedly 
uncorporatist approach of having Secretary of State Stimson 
negotiate directly, away from the conference, with the 
French, British, and German heads of state. 41 He did this 
but was unable to bring French Premier Andre Tardieu and 
Chancellor Bruning together. The importance that first 
Hoover, and later Roosevelt, placed on these disarmament 
talks meant that they realized a new way had to be found to 
deal with the problems of Germany and European stability. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ROOSEVELT AND THE END OF 
CORPORATISM IN FOREIGN POLICY 
The Disarmament Conference was still in progress and 
the London Economic Conference was in the planning stages 
when Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Herbert Hoover in the 
election of 1932. Roosevelt had traditionally been an 
internationalist but the Depression was the main issue in 
1932 and getting the country out of its serious economic 
difficulties was his first priority. He differed from 
Hoover in that he felt the solution could be found in a 
strong domestic policy rather than seeking solutions through 
international mechanisms as Hoover did. This was one 
difference that would help put an end to corporatism. 
Another factor was that F.D.R., even though he would 
eventually agree with the general line of thinking on 
foreign policy of Hoover's Secretary of State, Stimson, 
wished to distance himself from Hoover's recommendations on 
dealing with the economic problems in Europe. He not only 
did not want to be associated with Hoover's policies because 
of the public perception, but also because he did not want 
to make any firm commitments before he was even in office. 
The way foreign policy was made changed under the new 
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administration, returning to more traditional methods and 
turning away from the ''unofficial diplomats" of the 
financial intervention days. Roosevelt used men with 
experience in the executive departments, Congress, and 
diplomacy, rather than men from the world of finance who did 
not have offical ties to the U.S. government, to represent 
the U.S. in European settlements. 
Hoover had some firm ideas about war debts, the 
stabilization of currency and the London Economic Conference 
which he shared with Roosevelt during several exchanges 
between the election and F.D.R.'s inauguration. Hoover had 
already sent Stimson to talk to British Prime Minister 
Ramsey MacDonald in May of 1932 to plan for the conference. 
This wouldn't be a meeting of "experts" but a meeting 
which Hoover wanted MacDonald himself to head. The 
Moratorium would expire in November but the U.S. was still 
dealing with each country individually on the debt issue. 
The debtor governments were all requesting extensions and 
this was the pretense for the meetings between Roosevelt and 
Hoover. Also present at the first meeting were Ogden Mills, 
from the Treasury Department, and Professor Raymond Moley, a 
Roosevelt advisor who concluded, "that the President could 
scarcely have chosen a field in which there was less 
probability of sympathetic cooperation between the two 
administrations." 1 Hoover wanted to send a delegation to 
prepare for the conference, an idea which Roosevelt 
rejected, preferring to negotiate through ambassadors and 
2 department heads. 
Roosevelt also made use of secret emissaries, like 
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William Bullitt, who he sent to Europe in December of 1932. 
Bullitt was a private citizen with a solid grasp of foreign 
affairs and who also had been part of an American delegation 
at the Versailles conference, during which he went to 
investigate conditions in Russia. He reported on European 
attitudes toward the debts: "the outgoing American 
Administration's policy, if continued by the incoming one, 
might cause progressive falls of European governments and 
resulting conditions in some countries bordering on 
revolution." 3 Roosevelt also used Thomas Lamont to deal 
with the French on the debt issue and Norman Davis, who was 
already serving as a delegate to the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference and as a member of the planning commission for 
the economic conference. But F.D.R. was using these people 
more as gatherers of information rather than makers of 
policy, as the committees of "experts" had been. 
Roosevelt rejected using Hoover's diplomatic machinery 
of an "interlocking directorate'' which would tie together a 
comprehensive solution at both the London and Geneva talks. 4 
Also, Hoover maintained that an "adequate and proper 
machinery for dealing with the debts then must be created. 
It is clear ordinary diplomatic agencies and facilities are 
not suitable for the conduct of negotiations which can best 
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be carried on across the table by specially qualified 
representatives." 5 Roosevelt went along with neither the 
idea nor the urgency. Not believing in Hoover's theory that 
foreign problems caused the Depression, he believed that 
debts, reparations, economic issues (to be dealt with at 
London), and politics were all separate. He insisted on 
debt payment as he didn't wish to battle Congress over the 
issue while pursuing his main goal of independent federal 
planning at home. He would slowly confirm Hoover's worst 
fear by becoming an economic nationalist. Historian Joan 
Hoff-Wilson didn't believe the debt issue was as large in 
the public mind as policy makers would have it. 6 She cited 
the fact that the number of periodical articles on the 
subject had declined by two-thirds from the high in the mid-
1920' s to 1932. Even the nationalists in Congress had been 
unable to prevent the debt agreements of the mid and late 
1920's, which had reduced the total debt by forty percent 
through reduction in interest payments. She felt the 
leaders didn't attempt to mold public opinion, but merely 
assumed it had a greater impact on the debt issue than it 
really did. 7 
Stimson, however, felt public opinion was aroused 
during the Lausanne meetings in June of 1932, when 
MacDonald, Herriot, and German Chancellor Franz von Papen 
agreed to reduce reparations by about ninety percent. This 
still depended on the United States reducing war debts and 
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it was the leaks to the press which affected American public 
opinion and angered Hoover, who told Stimson, "in 
fundamentals, we had no common ground . . debts to us 
could and should be paid; and that the European nations were 
all in an iniquitous combine against us. 118 Stimson had 
become a "cancellationist", but he was also angered by the 
British and French attitudes and their effect on American 
public opinion. He felt that an increase in trade brought 
about by cancellation would more than compensate for the 
loss of debt payment. It would also create an atmosphere of 
political good will. But he had to follow Hoover's orders 
and could only express his disagreement in his diary, when 
on November 23, he wrote: "We have to depart from purely 
legal situation . . there is another side, and we all have 
to come to it sooner than later. The quicker we get these 
damn debts out of the way in some settlement the better off 
we will be. 119 Default began again after the Moratorium in 
December and became complete a year later in December of 
1933, which moved Stimson to write that the largest error 
was to believe "huge interest bearing loans made in 
emergency conditions for emergency purposes could ever be 
repaid by one government to another. It simply could not be 
done, politically. And when to the political differences 
there was added the peculiar tariff policy of the American 
nation, the assurance of default became doubly sure. 1110 
Despite his belief that the debts should be paid, 
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Hoover still felt some agreement over the debts had to be 
reached for the London Economic Conference to work. Hoover 
believed that failure to reach such an agreement soon would 
result in general default. 11 Roosevelt refused to go along 
with this however. It was not that he was against a 
settlement, it was just that he did not wish to rush things 
and make promises before he actually assumed power. In 
fact, he was willing to waive interest on the British debt 
and consider all previous interest payments as payment on 
the principle, with congressional approval. 12 As with 
previous administrations, he was often caught between the 
desire to accommodate the British on one side and the 
demands of Congress on the other. The Depression had 
strengthened isolationism in the Senate and the 
"irreconcilables", led by Senator Hiram Johnson, said that 
Europe had to be rebuilt from within and not with American 
money. 13 The British were not interested in this 
arrangement of cancelling the interest because they wanted a 
European settlement that also tied the debts to reparations, 
a connection that Roosevelt, like his predecessors, would 
not make. 
Roosevelt used a strategy of playing one side off 
against another in setting up his system of advisors and 
department heads. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote 
of him that he divided the powers around him; he 
"deliberately organized - or disorganized - his system of 
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command to insure that important decisions were passed on to 
the top." 14 This was quite evident in the way he built his 
foreign policy apparatus with two competing and contrary 
groups. He listened seriously to internationalists like 
Stimson and Davis, even keeping Stimson's State Department 
economic advisor, Herbert Feis. His new Secretary of State 
was the internationalist-oriented Cordell Hull and 
Undersecretary was the Wilsonian, William Phillips. In 
addition, J. Pierrepont Moffat was chief of Western European 
Affairs and Norman Davis became his ambassador at large. 
Yet at the same time, he assigned a staunch nationalist, 
Raymond Moley, to European economic matters as his new 
assistant Secretary of State. It was this rivalry between 
Moley and Hull which marked the early period of foreign 
policy. As historian Frank Freidel wrote, "Roosevelt, 
succeeding a cautious President who had restrained a dynamic 
Secretary of State, instantly reversed the order of things", 
often keeping both Moley and Hull in the dark as he acted on 
h . 15 is own. 
Roosevelt was against tying the war debts together with 
other economic issues in a comprehensive settlement. This 
did not please British Prime Minister MacDonald, who 
Roosevelt invited to Washington as part of a planning 
session for the Economic Conference. Roosevelt did not have 
a specific plan, but wanted an inflationary policy to drive 
prices up as a means of dealing with the Depression. This 
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went against what MacDonald and other European leaders 
desired, which was currency stability. He was hoping that a 
nationalistic monetary and economic policy would work fast 
enough to permit stabilization and tariff agreements at 
London. MacDonald and former French Prime Minister Herriot 
had come to Washington hoping for some promises on the debt 
issue, but were disappointed by Roosevelt's lack of 
commitment, claiming that he didn't know what Congress might 
allow him to give. 
Roosevelt showed a clear departure from the corporatist 
idea by choosing members of Congress and the State 
Department as delegates for the London Economic Conference, 
rather than members of the financial community who did not 
represent the government. He picked people who spread 
over a broad spectrum of political viewpoints and also 
people who had never been to an international conference 
before. In addition, he clearly had an eye toward appeasing 
Congress. Along with Cordell Hull, he chose Senator Key 
Pittman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former 
Democratic Party presidential nominee, James Cox, Republican 
Senator James Couzens, also of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Congressman Sam McReynolds, Chairman of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, and Ralph Morrison, a financial 
backer of the Democratic Party in Texas. 
When the Conference opened in June, currency 
stabilization was a large issue and Roosevelt's 
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intransigence on the issue stalled progress. He had taken 
the United States off the gold standard hoping for a rise in 
the dollar. Gold countries, such as France, Belgium, 
Holland and Switzerland, wanted a commitment to 
stabilization. F.D.R. refused, wishing to keep the United 
States free to pursue a price raising policy. Throughout 
the period of the conference, Roosevelt may have delegated 
duties, but he was making the decisions. He also was not 
using the bankers, a complete turnaround from the 
conferences of the corporatist 1920's. He was really 
finishing off both the corporatist operation and the 
conference when he delivered his ''bombshell" message on July 
3, when he proclaimed, "The sound internal economic system 
of a nation is a greater factor in its well being than the 
price of its currency in changing terms of the currencies of 
other nations ... old fetishes of so called international 
bankers are being replaced by efforts to plan national 
currencies with the objective of giving those currencies a 
continued purchasing power which does not greatly vary in 
terms of the commodities and needs of modern 
civilization." 16 . In publicly rejecting the currency 
stabilization declaration desired by the western Europeans, 
he claimed "American investors had trusted the debtor 
countries as they did their own, and yet they had wound up 
with worthless or depreciated bonds." 17 He also added that 
the tariff, another issue of the conference, would not be 
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lowered to allow dumping. The United States was now turning 
inward in an economically nationalistic direction. No 
longer were committees of ''experts" seeking international 
solutions that would benefit the United States~ foreign 
policy was now in the hands of a strong executive. 
Roosevelt took a much stronger personal role in the 
conferences than had earlier presidents in the 1920's. 
However the approach, while involving members of the 
government, rather than members of the financial community, 
seemed to lack the coherence of the corporatist approach. 
It was true that Roosevelt wanted higher prices while the 
Europeans wanted stabilization of currency which contributed 
to a confusion of aims. But as Cordell Hull related, the 
contradictory views characterized the American delegation as 
well: "Few mistakes can be more unfortunate than for the 
official head of a delegation to a world conference not to 
have a chance to consult with the President on the selection 
of the entire personnel - or at least let the personnel have 
that distinct impression. Otherwise there is little sense 
of loyalty or teamwork on the part of some, and open 
defiance from others."
18 
Hull spoke from disappointment at 
not being able to gain a reduction in trade barriers, his 
own special desire, which, according to Business Week, 
Roosevelt could have pushed through Congress in April, had 
he submitted the bill at that time. 19 But Hull also was 
frustrated by the attempt of Raymond Moley, the Assistant 
Secretary of State and more of an economic nationalist, to 
attempt to go over his head and act like the personal 
emissary of Roosevelt when he wasn't even part of the 
delegation. Maley was eventually rebuffed, but this added 
to the confusion and typified Roosevelt's approach of 
blurring the lines of authority among his underlings to 
maintain the final decision making capacity. State 
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Department economic advisor Herbert Feis also commented on 
the preparation for the Economcic Conference in April, that 
"there could hardly be worse difficulty and confusion than 
exists." 20 James P. Warburg, who Roosevelt also brought in 
to work on economic and political relations with Europe, 
along with Feis and William Bullitt, said of the uncertainty 
over commercial and economic policy, there are "two warring 
camps within the administration with no umpire settling the 
results between them." 21 
In the end, Roosevelt was concerned with domestic 
prices; he wanted them to rise and did not want them set 
from the outside, and so he rejected the European call for 
currency stability, dooming the conference. Our aim, he 
said, was to have "the kind of dollar which a generation 
hence will have the same purchasing power as the dollar we 
hope to obtain in the near future." Only "when the world 
works out concerted policies in the majority of nations to 
produce balanced budgets and living within their means, then 
can we properly discuss a better distribution of the world's 
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gold and silver supply to act as a reserve base of national 
currencies. 1122 Roosevelt was rejecting a world role. The 
domestic economy had to be rescued through internal 
mechanisms, according to Roosevelt, thus pushing aside the 
Hoover view that the international economic situation was 
much to blame for America's woes and thus had to be dealt 
with. 
Most of Roosevelt's advisors, including Hull and Meley, 
were very surprised at the bombshell message of July 3, that 
effectively doomed the conference. It showed that the 
President was acting virtually alone, and and without regard 
to European interests. Meley related Ramsay MacDonald's 
reaction: he was "distraught . . . The President's action, 
he bemoaned, had both wrecked the conference and shattered 
h . 1 . . ..23 is own persona position. 
However, F.D.R.'s desires in foreign policy were often 
kept in check by his realization that domestic policy was 
his first priority and if he could gain what he wanted in 
this area, he would need to sacrifice some foreign policy 
goals. Disarmament was the most important foreign issue for 
him and his perception of what Congress would allow him in 
this area hampered his ability to make commitments in Europe 
that might have contributed to some positive results. 
The Geneva Disarmament Conference had begun in early 
1932. The problem revolved around the German desire for 
equality, the French desire for security, and the American 
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desire for neutrality. As Secretary of State under Hoover, 
Stimson believed that Germany had real grievances. He also 
understood that German foreign policy was a result of the 
internal strains caused by the existence of a large number 
of Communists on the left and Nazis on the right. He 
therefore wanted them to realize that (mutual disarmament) 
"defenselessness was the best protection in my opinion and 
would sooner or later force the other countries to 
reason." 24 It was the French policy which undermined this 
notion however. Security was all that mattered to them; so 
much so that Britain felt French preoccupation with security 
would produce the type of Germany the French most feared. 
Even Pierre Laval, the French Premier, admitted as much, 
when he told Stimson that the Versailles Treaty's "effect 
upon Central Europe was an absurdity, but it was a political 
impossibility to change it." Stimson responded by referring 
to the "oscillation of history back and forth between 
Germany and France and pointed out the Versailles Treaty 
froze an extreme oscillation which was unfavorable to 
Germany at the farthest point of unfavorability .•. Any 
attempt to perpetuate such an oscillation would meet with 
failure." 25 To this there was no record of Laval's reply, 
or even if he replied. 
Laval wanted a consultative agreement with the U.S. but 
Hoover had maintained that this was an impossibility. That 
neither the Americans nor the British would give the French 
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any guarantees meant that France had no incentive to disarm. 
Regarding this situation, Stimson told Bruning in April of 
1932, that it was like the "unfolding of a Greek tragedy, 
where we could see the march of events and know what ought 
to be done, but seemed to be powerless to prevent its 
h . . . 1 . ..26 mare ing to its grim cone usion. 
The two key American delegates to the Conference, 
Norman Davis and Hugh Gibson, did not report that the French 
were intransigent however, only that they did not expect any 
guarantees from the Americans. The French just wanted the 
United States to "refrain from cutting across the course of 
action determined on by the League, that would be a maximum 
which could be hoped for from America. 1127 It was at this 
point that Hoover made his proposal for the abolition of 
most offensive weapons, including tanks, bomber planes, 
chemical weapons, and large mobile guns, as well as the 
reduction of land forces by one-third. The French insisted 
on consultation and the Americans replied that this could 
not be put in treaty form. 28 The Germans pushed for 
equality at the Conference, which was going nowhere by the 
time F.D.R. came into office. 
The Conference reconvened, after a recess, in February 
of 1933. By March, serious Nazi terrorism had begun with 
the Reichstag fire and the ensuing emergency decrees which 
first outlawed the Communist Party, the alleged perpetrator 
of the fire, and soon effectively put an end to all civil 
101 
rights in Germany. At Geneva, Ramsay MacDonald claimed, 
"either Germany is given justice and freedom or Europe will 
risk destruction." 29 MacDonald put forth a plan that gave 
both concessions to Germany and reassurance to France. 
MacDonald also wanted to tie in American involvement with 
the war debt question, which Roosevelt wouldn't do. 30 
MacDonald's plan called for consultation upon the 
identification of an aggressor, but this would upset the 
neutrality that Congress insisted upon. Still, Roosevelt 
recognized the German threat: "We regard Germany as the only 
possible obstacle to a Disarmament Treaty." 31 Hull echoed 
the sentiment after receiving a telegram from Ambassador 
Hugh Gibson from Geneva. He believed that in the case of a 
complete breakdown in the Conference, which seemed likely, 
that Germany would immediately disregard the disarmament 
clauses of the Versailles Treaty and rearm in earnest. 32 In 
this regard, Gibson reported that the issue was one of 
relations among the European nations and that American 
disarmament was no issue at all. What the French were 
concerned about was the American political position toward 
Europe. What they wanted to know specifically, was whether, 
if Germany became an aggressor, the United States would 
uphold their rights as a neutral and hold to the traditional 
policy of freedom of the seas, in the case of an application 
of sanctions against Germany. Gibson favored refraining 
from any action which would defeat sanctions, in exchange 
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for a French guarantee of disarmament. 33 
Norman Davis, the chief delegate at the Conference for 
the United States, also recognized both the dangerous 
consequences of an adjournment and the connection of 
disarmament to economic questions. Both he and Hull pushed 
these views on Roosevelt and F.D.R. seemed to take them to 
heart. It was still Roosevelt's decision however, as he had 
taken over firm control of the foreign policy process. In 
May, Roosevelt received Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, again the 
president of the German Reichsbank, who was in Washington to 
talk about restructuring debts. Roosevelt told Schacht 
however, that he insisted that Germany remain at current 
levels in armaments, and that "we would support every 
possible effort to have the offensive armament of every 
other nation brought down to the German level. 11 34 It was at 
this point that he made his comment about Germany being the 
main obstacle to disarmament and he wanted Schacht to report 
these views to Hitler as soon as possible. Schacht was more 
interested in communicating the point that German 
obligations would no longer be paid in foreign currency, in 
essence defaulting on securities purchased throughout the 
1920's. Hull reportedly reacted with indignance while 
Schacht reported that there were no hard feelings. There 
are differing versions of who got the best of these 
meetings, the German, or Hull and Roosevelt 35 Nonetheless, 
it was indicative of who was now presiding over foreign 
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policy, especially issues that dealt with economics. 
Roosevelt was taking the lead. 
The President also asserted himself in a speech on May 
16, 1933, which was meant to influence Hitler, who had a 
speech planned for May 17. He came out strongly for peace, 
joint security, and the elimination of offensive weapons. 
Hitler's speech the following day was conciliatory: "Germany 
is ready immediately to endorse the American President's 
magnanimous proposal to put up the powerful United States as 
a guarantor of peace." 36 Along with Davis's speech in 
Geneva, which called for a United States determination to 
consult, determine guilt, and take measures to refrain from 
action which would defeat collective action, the western 
Europeans were hopeful and F.D.R. himself felt that he had 
prevented war. But there was too much divergence between 
Hitler's speech and his actions and Congress gave no 
endorsement of such a guarantee from the United States The 
efforts of 1933 were doomed to fail and the United States 
would turn inward. 
Part of the problem was that Roosevelt would not fight 
the Senate's Johnson Amendment of May 1933, that sought to 
put a ban on exports in a dispute to all countries involved, 
taking away presidential discretion. Another was the 
ignorance of balance of power considerations, as evidenced 
by Davis' statement for Roosevelt on May 15, 1933: "It does 
not contribute to peace and stability in Europe to keep the 
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largest and most populous of the nations (Germany) in a 
permanent condition of inequality." 36 German superiority 
and its desire for further domination of the continent was 
a major factor in the outbreak of World War I. 
Roosevelt had raised the hopes of the western Europeans 
only leave them disappointed at London and Geneva. Unlike 
the Republicans who preceded him, he attempted no 
corporatist way around the impasse, though unlike them, he 
saw a need for political as well as economic commitments. 
It was the timing of the political and content of the 
economic that was disputed. But he had taken the lead, to 
the point of ignoring the recommendations of his delegation 
at London, and did nothing to back up Davis' words at 
Geneva, deferring instead to the Johnson Amendment. The 
discredited bankers were now on the outside however, as 
F.D.R. took control of the foreign policy process. He 
merely chose to sacrifice more control over foreign affairs 
to gain what he wanted domestically. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE UNCERTAINTY OF POLICY APPROACH IN THE MID-1930's 
Corporatist historians write about a corporate design 
or corporate liberalism in the 1930's, but it appears to be 
confined to domestic politics. Michael Hogan claims to 
"have tried to show how the Great Depression of the 1930s 
combined with changes in the industrial structure to produce 
the New Deal coalition", but focuses more on the design of 
the 1920's and the post-World War II reconstruction of 
Europe when it comes to foreign policy. 1 Likewise, Ellis w. 
Hawley writes about the 1930's "as the efforts of a 
pluralistic social order with liberal commitments to find 
private structures and elites capable of correcting 
perceived ills and malfunctions . . in which state 
agencies collaborated with and became attached to private 
orders." 2 He mentions as examples the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, the National Labor Relations Board, and 
other attempts of state action to produce new private 
orders. In a related article, Kim McQuaid tells how this 
corporate liberalism was in recession in the late 1930's 
because of business disillusionment with the National 
d . . t. 3 Recovery A m1n1stra ion. 
If anything, there was less cooperation and shared 
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interests between government and business in the 1930's 
regarding the international scene. As Emily Rosenberg 
pointed out, the successful companies had to negotiate their 
own agreements with foreign governments as business went 
multinational while governments became nationalistic. 4 She 
cited the oil companies as a good example. The new 
administration moved away from liberal internationalism and 
toward a regulatory system that hopefully would produce new 
powers for the executive branch. 
The Depression had certainly changed the policy of the 
1920's. The bankers had lost influence as well as the 
ability or the desire to loan Germany more money. There was 
no chance of any continuance of the sort of diplomacy that 
was characterized by the "committees of experts''. Also, the 
Depression had helped bring Hitler to power in Germany and 
Nazi aims were very unclear to the United States in 1933, 
which helped further confuse policy toward Germany. 
As early as December of 1931, a memo prepared in the 
State Department observed that Hitler's "groups will attain 
power soon" and that his "program and ideas seem to resemble 
those of Fascist Italy" especially when it came to the 
relationship of government and industry. 5 But the early 
observations on Hitler were also mistaken in one crucial 
regard; that "Hitlerism is based on the old Hohenzollern and 
Prussian idea of strong centralization, imperialism and 
expansion." 6 It is true that Hitler favored these things, 
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but it went much deeper than this: as historian Brooks Van 
Everen pointed out, well into the period when Hitler had 
already assumed power, American policy makers were still 
equating Hitler with traditional German conservatism, 
maintaining that the Nazis relied on the monarchists, the 
Prussian Junkers, the army officers, and the large 
· d · l' 7 1n ustr1a 1sts. As David Schoenbaum pointed out, the Nazi 
revolution came as much from the lower and middle classes as 
anywhere, though it didn't come from any one group. 8 
Roosevelt and Hull went with the traditional line of 
thinking in 1933. In his memoirs, foreign policy expert 
George Kennen was "shocked to realize" that Roosevelt "still 
pictured Prussian Junkertum as a mainstay of Hitler's 
9 power." 
The administration seemed to be ignoring evidence that 
the Nazis had widespread support. Ambassador Sackett wrote 
from Berlin regarding the March 1933 elections that, 
"Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this election is 
that an anti-democratic party, with avowed dictatorial 
aspirations, has managed to obtain power by means of the 
secret ballot. 1110 Later, the new Ambassador, William E. 
Dodd, claimed that the revolution would reorganize and 
restructure society along Nazi lines and George Messersmith, 
Consul General at the time, wrote that "no government has 
rested more firmly on the support of a greater proportion of 
the general population than does the German population of 
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today." 11 It was the misperceptions in Washington of the 
radical nature of the Nazis that appeared to slow a more 
dynamic approach to the problem, along with a preoccupation 
with domestic issues. 
The Roosevelt administration in Washington was not the 
only one to be caught by the "Diplomacy of Surprise", as 
Michael I. Handel called it in his book of the same name. 
He maintained that Hitler went after the diplomatic 
surprise, or "fait accompli", between 1933 and 1936, by 
surprising stronger neighbors during a period of rebuilding 
militarily while trying to avoid retaliation. 12 After this 
period, he was able to shift to a strategy of ultimatums, 
which helped him overcome the Versailles Treaty restrictions 
and gain what other German leaders had failed to get. 
Hitler was not from the old European school of diplomacy, 
which the other European leaders had hoped and expected he 
would be, and they recognized this too late. He often used 
deception, as with the peace speech of May 17, 1933, which 
was a response to Roosevelt's warning speech of the day 
before. 
Throughout 1933, Germany was looking for a way to gain 
respectability in the disarmament talks while always looking 
for a way to make it look like the French would be to blame 
if the talks failed. They claimed that "At the Disarmament 
Conference Germany had never demanded more than to be 
permitted to possess the same means of defense as all other 
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States. 1113 Foreign Minister Neurath wrote "that if a 
failure of the Conference really proves inevitable, the lack 
of an intention to disarm on the part of France must appear 
as the cause 1114 When the Germans did pull out of the 
Conference and the League of Nations in October, the 
reaction in the United States was against Hitler but more 
isolationist than ever: Roosevelt and Hull informed Davis 
in Geneva, that "we are not interested in the political 
elements or any purely European aspect of the picture 11 • 15 
American foreign policy toward Germany was affected by 
some conflicting reports from Germany. Leon Dominican, the 
Consul General in Stuttgart, wrote to Hull in April, of the 
tendency toward the "cynical militarism of their 
predecessors of pre-Weimar days", perpetuating the idea of a 
. 16 h . 1 h' . l' return to conservatism. T e Commercia Attac e in Ber in, 
Douglas Miller, wrote that the Nazis were "young, ignorant, 
romantic" misfits, wanting a "return to medieval status 
where the individual does not have to do his own 
thinking. 1117 He believed that Mein Kampf was propaganda and 
that the military threat was not great. This was in 
conflict with some of the other reports and created a 
certain amount of confusion. Still, Dodd and Messersmith 
were diplomats that Roosevelt had a lot of faith in, and 
their reports were consistently pessimistic and full of 
warning about the situation in Germany. 
Besides the conflicting reports, the men most involved 
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in the foreign policy process at this time, brought 
different perceptions and interpretations, and thus 
different recommendations to the problem of Nazi Germany. 
Ambassador Dodd, Secretary of State Hull, and the State 
Department's chief of the Division of Western European 
Affairs, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, all had an impact on the 
formulation of policy, yet held divergent views. According 
to historian Stefan H. Leader, this was important in the 
early years of the Roosevelt administration, but less so 
after 1935, when Moffat was transferred and the views of 
Hull and Dodd became less divergent. 17 Dodd, who wanted 
cooperation with the European democracies to stop Germany, 
was an economic determinist, who believed in the value of 
free trade to avoid conflict, while Moffat was more of an 
isolationist who also saw a need to protect investments. 18 
Hull and Dodd were both influenced by the failure of 
protectionist policy in the 1920's and early 1930's and its 
effect on Germany's inability to pay reparations. 
Another factor in foreign policy was the attitude of 
the Senate. In early 1934 isolationist sentiment was not at 
a high point. Roosevelt had relative freedom during this 
period. He was able to gain the recognition of the Soviet 
Union, in the hope that new markets might be opened. He 
also worked to keep the Anglo-American-Japanese naval 
agreements intact at the 5:5:3 ratio, which was eventually 
rejected by Japan and led to Roosevelt gaining a large 
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increase in the naval budget by 1936. The Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act in 1934 led to an increase in trade if not 
making it freer. By 1935, however, sentiment turned against 
involvement in European affairs as the threat of war in 
Europe increased. 
Yet in one of the most crucial tests of the 
administration's ability to influence affairs in Europe, 
they came up empty. Roosevelt went along with a State 
Department desire to sponsor a bill that meant the United 
States would be "willing to consult with other states in 
case of a threat to the peace, with a view to averting 
conflict", and would "refrain from any action tending to 
defeat collective effort" to restore the peace. 18 Hull 
called this "a radical change in the traditional attitude of 
this country toward two old principles -- neutrality and 
freedom of the seas. It meant that, if other nations 
instituted sanctions against a nation they deemed an 
aggressor, we would do nothing to interfere with such 
sanctions if we determined on our own that the other nations 
had made the right choice of the aggressor 11 • 19 The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee moved against it however, and 
attached amendments that would apply an embargo to both 
parties in a dispute, taking away the President's 
discretionary power. Roosevelt did not fight this, despite 
protest from Hull. This was indicative of what some 
historians felt was a lack of initiative on Roosevelt's part 
toward foreign policy both at this time and later, 
especially during the Czech crisis of 1938. 21 
Aside from the question of what the United States 
should do about an increasingly threatening Germany, the 
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main issues in American- German relations in the mid-1930's 
had to do with trade, discrimination against American 
lenders (especially holders of German bonds), the treatment 
of Jews, and disarmament (which had to do with the original 
question). For Secretary of State Hull, trade was always a 
key issue, because of his belief in the contribution of 
freer trade toward international peace and prosperity. To 
this extent, Hull didn't like the growing protest against 
German treatment of Jews because of its possible negative 
effect on economic relations. Roosevelt told Dodd that the 
United States could "do nothing" as it was not "not a 
governmental affair 11 . 22 The State Department economic 
advisor, Herbert Feis, later summarized the attitude toward 
tackling the problem of the Nazi treatment of Jews: "that it 
was inadvisable • • our chances of securing the 
cooperation of the Nazi regime in international economic and 
political affairs and in disarmament by interfering to 
protest the Jewish and other minorities in Germany. Not 
only inadvisable but probably futile. 1123 
Of more practical interest to Hull and Roosevelt was 
the trade issue, because they had more control over it. The 
trade issue was one which could also put them back into an 
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internationalist mode, rather than looking inward. One 
reason for this was that the first year of the New Deal had 
not brought quick recovery and some new tactics were in 
order. The vehicle for this would be the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act. Lloyd c. Gardner called this act "the basis 
of New Deal foreign economic policy." 24 In fighting for his 
trade liberalism, Hull was trying to gain more control over 
foreign policy for the President and State Department. The 
key was to gain presidential discretion over the raising and 
lowering of tariffs and the goal was to restore foreign 
markets and play a greater role in the world economy. 
One of President Wilson's special advisors, Edward M. 
House, had written in Foreign Affairs, that the tariff 
problem the administration faced was, "how to enable 
foreigners to earn enough dollars here to pay their debts 
and to take our exports, without the necessity of foreign 
loans. 1125 Roosevelt received advice from others also, that 
trade through reciprocal trade agreements could greatly help 
recovery. The plan would call for an unconditional most-
favored-nation status for those foreign countries which 
entered into agreements. This meant that a nation would 
agree to lower tariffs on certain items when the U.S. did 
likewise, and if third parties received better concessions 
on the good in question, the U.S. would get the lower rate. 
Hull received support in his efforts from groups like the 
American Manufacturers Export Association and the National 
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F . d . 1 25 oreign Tra e Counci . The Act was eventually passed by 
Congress in 1934. 
The Trade Agreements Act was also part of Hull's 
strategy to bring Germany into line through economic 
measures. Germany was embarking on a program of economic 
autarky, or self-sufficiency, and in the process, was 
beginning to take measures to ensure better trade balances. 
The first act in pursuit of this goal was the announcement 
on May 8, 1933, that they were suspending interest payments 
on private debts to American bankers (excluding the Dawes 
and Young Plan loans and any agreements made after July 15, 
1931). 26 The lenders would receive only fifty percent in 
transferable currency and the rest in scrip, which could be 
used to purchase German goods or could be redeemed at a 
Discount Bank for a fifty percent discount. The result was 
payment on only seventy-five percent of the total, the rest 
subsidized German exporters. Hull called this one of 
Germany's "numerous colossal frauds ... This was a 
wholesale dishonest and fraudulent policy of the German 
Government to rearm on a gigantic scale by robbing and 
defrauding all other governments and their citizens of every 
possible penny • in order to promote German's scheme of 
rearmament without precedent in magnitude." 
27 
Another 
problem he referred to with these statements was a German 
law that forbade the removal of profits from Germany of 
American owned businesses operating there. Furthermore, 
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they "invented nearly a score of different reichsmarks with 
varying exchange rates" and "A nation that made an economic 
agreement with Germany seldom knew what it was getting in 
return. 1129 
The question was, what to do about these things, to 
give some concessions in the hope it would get better, or to 
retaliate and risk further damage to the United States' 
economy. The problem was complicated by the fact that the 
United States had an enormously favorable trade balance with 
Germany, unlike most other countries. Britain for example, 
simply seized the payments for German goods they imported 
because they did not have a favorable trade balance with 
Germany. 30 This strategy worked and Germany stopped 
discriminating against British lenders. The Germans also 
chose not to discriminate against Swiss and Dutch 
bondholders, for example, further angering the Americans and 
indicating the lack of unified action in European politics 
which alienated the United States. 31 The reaction was 
usually to do nothing but protest. 
George Peek, head of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, fought against Hull's trade policy and 
wanted to increase trade with Germany at this time, even 
after Schacht had announced in July of 1934 that Germany 
would suspend payments on the Dawes and Young loans as well 
as the others. He tried to influence the President with 
businessmen and bankers, who "advocated our making an 
118 
arrangement with Germany whereby we would take more of her 
goods in return for her paying the American holders of the 
Dawes-Young loans". 32 The State Department set up a 
committee to deal with this problem. On October 12, 1934, 
it concluded that no bilateral trade agreement with Germany 
should be made, because "the whole complexion of affairs may 
be quite different in a year or two. It is not likely that 
the current German commercial policy can last for any 
considerable period of time." 33 Hull argued further, that 
any deal with Germany would undermine American efforts at 
reciprocal trade deals elsewhere and make the United States 
look hypocritical. Hull won out but not before the Treasury 
Department had imposed an increased tariff on German goods, 
a retaliatory measure which prompted Germany to back off in 
the trade war and debt discrimination. 34 Nonetheless, 
German-American relations continued in a negative direction. 
Despite the souring of official relations, relations 
between German and American business firms continued to 
evolve. Many deals went on that contributed to the 
rearmament of Germany, of which the State Department was 
either unaware or chose not to interfere. This indicated a 
lack of coordination between government and business and an 
undermining of the corporatist scheme. Not only was there a 
lack of coordination, but a lack of cooperation. Typical of 
this was the attitude of business during the Italian-
Ethiopian War, which began in October of 1935: they felt 
they could sell what they wanted, as long as it was legal, 
and thus proceeded to triple the sale of oil to Italy in 
less than two months. 35 This was in complete defiance of 
Hull's response to the war: "I did not want the aggressor, 
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though forbidden to buy our arms, ammunition, and implements 
of war, to buy the raw materials out of which he himself 
could make the sinews of war. Here was the beginning of our 
moral embargo, so called because it rested on moral rather 
than on legal foundations." 36 
Gabriel Kolko's article, "American Business and 
Germany, 1930-1941", is full of examples of the trade that 
went on with Germany which significantly aided German 
preparedness for war, despite the public stance of American 
business, which came out against fascism and Nazism. 37 To 
begin with, there was the cartel-like collaboration of the 
German chemical giant, I.G. Farben, which was highly 
integrated into the government preparation and planning for 
war, and the American giant, Du Pont. I.G. Farben was 
involved with exclusive deals with American businesses 
despite the fact that many American businessmen knew that 
b · 1 d · 1 · 
38 I.G. Far en was invo ve in war p anning. Standard Oil 
also entered into agreement with I.G. Farben in 1929 for 
fear of market competition upsetting the world oil price. 
This agreement actually went uncovered by the United States 
government until 1941 and greatly contributed to I.G. 
Farben's rubber development as well as resulting in patents 
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for I.G. Farben to develop superior methods for making 
explosives. Standard Oil fulfilled these patent agreements 
with I.G. Farben, depriving Britain and France, even after 
the War began. Furthermore, I.G. Farben received 20 million 
dollars from the Nazi government, to buy aviation gas from 
Standard, without the knowledge of the United States 
39 government. 
General Motors was also heavily involved in Germany, 
producing not just motor cars. Opel, a completely owned 
subsidiary of G.M., together with Ford, was Germany's 
largest tank producer by April of 1939, producing over half 
of Germany's tanks. 4° For the Americans, motivated by a 
fear of competition, profits were the guiding factor, and if 
they could not export them, they would reinvest them in 
Germany. A spokesman for the Dow Chemical Company 
maintained, "we do not inquire into the uses of the 
products. We are interested in selling them." 41 At the 
same time, the Germans looked at this business in terms of 
political goals. 
Kolko, a Marxist, concluded that the interest which 
drove business during this period was class interest; that 
profits and stability could best be gained by collaboration 
in the business world in the form of cartels and market 
agreements. 42 Their actions were not consistent with the 
interests of the United States government nor with their own 
publically stated anti-war position. In this way, the 
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corporatist model seemed to be turned around, as big 
business influenced developments in German foreign policy 
and thus indirectly, United States foreign policy, not only 
without the consent and approval of the United States 
government, but often without its knowledge as well. 
All of this went against what some of Roosevelt's most 
valued observers, such as George Messersmith, Consul General 
in Berlin, advised. He wanted to block trade negotiations 
and bring on economic instability as a way to bring Hitler 
down. But even if this didn't work, the United States should 
not deal with a nation "not willing to protect existing 
interests, getting ready to repudiate its debts, and asking 
for new agreements and new credits with which to get raw 
materials, a good deal of which are destined for 
t " rearmamen · 43 The Commercial Attache in Berlin, Douglas 
Miller, also argued that there was nothing the United States 
wanted or needed from Germany. Hull, despite his belief in 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, did not endorse making 
such an agreement with Germany, especially after they 
announced as part of their "new plan", that they would buy 
only as much from a country as they sold. A treaty was 
signed, but without the most-favored-nation status. Trade 
declined to the point where Germany took less than half the 
amount of imports they had taken from the United States 
(from 8.4 percent of the United States export total, to 3.7 
percent) from 1933 to 1938. Similarly, during the same 
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period, the United States share of Germany's total exports 
declined from 5.4 to 3.3 percent. 44 But most significantly, 
the export of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, oil, and base 
metals to Germany increased, including the tripling of 
petroleum exports from 1934 to 1938. This led Messersmith 
to comment in 1936, that American firms were "used for the 
maintenance of German industrial progress and in some 
important directions for German rearmament, which is 
obviously not intended for defensive, but aggressive 
measures." 45 Thus astute observers like Messersmith 
realized that not only was business not in cooperation with 
government policy, their actions worked against the State 
Department goals of disarmament and a reduction in trade 
with Germany. 
1935 and early 1936 proved to be a most critical period 
for both the deterioration of German-American relations and 
for Hitler, in his effort to achieve his goals, including 
the renunciation of the Versailles Treaty. In March of 1935 
he began the open repudiation of the Treaty by revealing the 
existence of a military air force and plans for an army of 
550,000 men, which prompted France to double the length of 
service for its conscripts and Roosevelt to ask for the 
largest peacetime defense budget in United States history. 46 
Even before this, on October 1, 1934, Hitler had secretly 
told Chief of Staff, Ludwig Beck, of his intent to order 
conscription by April and to keep it secret until then.
47 
It was not that Britain and France did not know what 
was going on. Germany's departure from the League of 
Nations and the Disarmament Conference had convinced most 
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observers that Hitler would attempt to rearm. By March of 
1934, Britain realized that Germany had possibly 350 
military aircraft and could produce them at about a rate of 
60 per month and that by March of 1935 they could have a 
fully equipped army of 300,00o. 48 At this point, however, 
their attitude was one of evading the issue because they 
were still stronger than Germany and that the Treaty could 
be changed if "negotiated". British Foreign Secretary John 
Simon wanted permission for Germany to rearm in exchange for 
a comprehensive European settlement which would revise the 
Treaty, which France rejected. 49 Britain and France, along 
with Italy, condemned the German announcements of March 1935 
one month later at the Stresa Conference, the last attempt 
at coordination against aggression in Europe. But they did 
nothing and the conference produced nothing of substance. 
Then in June, without consulting France or Italy, Britain 
concluded a naval treaty with Germany, which allowed Germany 
naval expansion to 35 percent of British tonnage and 60 
percent of British submarine capability. They were 
negotiating, bilaterally, an end to the military provisions 
of the Versailles Treaty. 
Hull, Moffat, and Roosevelt all preferred to make no 
statement and no official announcement was made regarding 
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the developments of March. As for the naval agreement 
between Germany and Britain, the administration even felt it 
t · th · h d' · 50 was a s ep in e rig t irection. Ambassador Luther was 
able to report back to Berlin, that though the direction of 
American policy might be hard to determine for the future, 
at present the Congress would successfully prevent any 
intervention in European affairs. "In the final analysis 
one respects the restoration of German military power as a 
fact about which other nations can in effect, do nothing." 51 
Hitler was beginning to realize that the United States 
would do nothing and planned accordingly, despite repeated 
warnings from the key American observers in Germany, Dodd 
and Messersmith, who agreed that the continued existence of 
the Nazi regime would give the United States "something to 
reckon with" and that "innocent isolationism" would bring 
grief. 52 Dodd had felt from the beginning that Nazi 
aggression would probably lead to war without United States 
intervention. Even when Hitler made a supposedly peace-
seeking speech in May of 1935, Dodd saw the smokescreen: 
"The Hitler speech was designed, very cleverly for him, to 
divide his opponents and give the necessary time for 
preparedness ... the solid front of Stresa and Geneva is 
weakening . . • inside Germany arms manufacturers of every 
possible kind goes on night and day". 53 His assessment was 
confirmed by the Anglo-German naval agreement. 
Other key events and the way they were reacted to, 
12S 
showed that the United States was staying out of European 
affairs, officially, and were to attempt no more of the 
economic diplomacy of the earlier period. Furthermore, 
Roosevelt would withdraw from his own efforts to strengthen 
his ability to influence foreign affairs, by deferring to 
Congress on key provisions that would have given him more 
power. 
The Italian invasion of Ethiopia was encouraged by the 
alienation of the allies, especially France and Italy, 
caused by the Anglo-German naval deal.s 4 The United States 
attempted to stay neutral as the Neutrality Act forbade 
embargoing only an aggressor, as Hull and Roosevelt had 
wanted, but applied to all parties at war. American 
business, despite Hull's "moral" embargo, continued to 
supply Italy with crucial raw materials. This same "moral" 
embargo applied to Italy and Germany in their assistance to 
the fascist cause in the Spanish Civil War. The State 
Department maintained that they could not put an arms 
embargo on Germany or Italy because no official state of war 
existed between them and Spain, despite the fact that 
Germany contributed critical personnel and assistance in the 
bombing and artillery phases of the war.SS The embargo on 
the Republican government in Spain helped the fascists win 
the war. 
The final indication that the United States would not 
intervene in any way, came with the official reaction to 
126 
Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland, which 
effectively ended both the Versailles and Locarno Treaties. 
Despite the fact that Ambassador Dodd had warned Foreign 
Minister Neurath of possibly strict economic sanctions, 
including a cut off in shipments of oil, steel, and cotton, 
Hitler felt the moment was at hand and that only a French 
show of military resistance would compel him to halt the 
reoccupation by German troops of the Rhineland. 56 The 
American Ambassador in France, Jesse Strauss, asked if 
Roosevelt or Hull would issue an official protest. Neither 
did. Roosevelt, just one week before, had extended the 
Neutrality Act of 1935 for another year, which would keep an 
arms embargo on all entering a war, preventing support by 
League members who would fight aggression. On the Rhineland 
remilitarization, the State Department maintained that the 
United States had no part in Locarno and that it was not 
United States business. In his message to Strauss, Hull 
just confirmed that "F.D.R. O.K." in response to this 
. t. 57 posi ion. Ambassador Luther could write to the Foreign 
Ministry about the State Department reaction, that "the 
German step was to have been expected, that it is indeed 
understandable, since, after all, it is German territory 
which is involved, and that it promises a pacification of 
the European atmosphere which would have been unthinkable as 
long as Germany had not obtained full sovereignty". Also, 
"In Congress circles the reaction, with some exceptions, is 
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in general also sympathetic." 58 
Roosevelt made one last attempt to deal with Germany 
when he asked Dodd to notify him if there was an opportunity 
that he might "personally and secretly" gain a response from 
Hitler concerning peace and the German foreign policy goals 
59 for the next ten years. Dodd talked to Schacht, Hans 
Dieckhoff, who handled American affairs for the Foreign 
Ministry, and Neurath, all of whom reiterated the German 
demands for colonies and a condemnation of the Franco-Soviet 
rapproachment. Roosevelt made no peace initiative and by 
the end of the year, America regarded Europe's political 
problems as "hopeless", according to Luther. 60 Roosevelt 
did make one other attempt to set up a conference with the 
British to explore cooperation, but British Prime Minister 
Chamberlain felt it might be more provocative than 
preventative, and it never came off. 
Chamberlain had told Treasury Secretary Morganthau in 
March, that the "greatest single contribution that the 
United States could make at the present moment to the 
preservation of world peace would be the amendment of the 
existing neutrality legislation". 61 But once again, 
domestic considerations swayed Roosevelt. At this point in 
1937 he was in a battle with Congress over the Supreme Court 
and gave in on the Neutrality Bill as he had done before, 
when pushing too hard for presidential discretion on arms 
embargoes would have, he felt, jeopardized New Deal domestic 
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legislation. In October of 1937, Roosevelt gave his 
"Quarantine" speech, which indicated no change in policy, 
only warnings about where the world was headed: "a state of 
international anarchy and instability from which there is no 
escape through mere isolation or neutrality." 62 At this 
point, German-American relations were almost dead and their 
would be no more great initiatives to stabilize Europe, 
economic or otherwise. The corporatist approach had been 
buried under an onslaught of isolation, economic 
nationalism, the Depression, and Nazi militarism. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
It is not the purpose of this paper to explore what 
happens to corporatism after World War II, though financial 
intervention does begin to take place in Europe again at 
that time. The purpose of this thesis was to explore how 
corporatism lost its way in the 1930's in American foreign 
policy toward Germany. It was defeated by a number of 
factors. The old dichotomy of isolationism versus 
internationalism definitely played a part. The Senate 
established with its rejection of the Versailles Treaty that 
it would not go along with European entanglements and so the 
Republican administrations of the 1920's sought a way around 
this obstacle, because they felt intervention would be 
beneficial to United States interests in the long run; that 
peace and prosperity could be purchased with American 
financial intervention to stabilize Europe, which to a great 
degree, entailed stabilizing Germany. 
The corporatist method itself was partly responsible 
for its own downfall in the 1930's. It ignored political 
realities and connections, especially the effects of massive 
loans to German governments and the connection between 
reparations and war debts. Furthermore, it was not always 
clear or certain that the corporatist scheme was a 
premeditated plan or whether it was merely a reaction to 
circumstances. The loan control policy was an example of 
the lack of collaboration and of clear goals. One can not 
blame just bankers for the Depression, but their 
overextension to Germany was characteristic of one of the 
causes of the Depression: speculation and lending without 
sufficient caution. The experts involved at the highest 
levels, men like Gilbert, Lamont, and Schacht, all worked 
against this speculative frenzy, but ultimately, without 
success, indicating further, that the whole scheme was 
lacking in cooperation. In addition, the use of financial 
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experts who did not represent the government was a reaction 
to the desire of Congress to keep the United States out of 
European affairs. 
Finally Hoover, and then Roosevelt, as well as the 
bankers themselves, realized the plan was not working and 
they had to turn to new tactics. By 1932, Hoover began 
working for international conferences that would involve 
statesmen and diplomats. By 1933, Roosevelt was sending 
senators and department heads to London to iron out the 
economic difficulties the United States and Europe faced. 
He was also taking on the policy process himself, both with 
his influence over the American delegations at the 
conferences in London and Geneva, and with his speeches that 
were tailored for Hitler's consumption. 
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The United States had put its relations with Germany on 
an economic basis for much of the inter-war period and 
realized too late that this influence would have little 
effect on the Nazi regime. Unfortunately, the corporatist 
relationship had declined so significantly, that American 
business was able to contribute to the Nazi build-up, 
against the best interests of the United States, unlike the 
1920's, when government and the financial sector shared a 
vision of what was best for the United States. In the 
1930's, business defied Hull's "moral" embargo. By the late 
1930's, the government of the U.S. had turned inward to an 
extent that made initiatives toward Germany and Europe 
difficult, and they could only wait for war to come and then 
react to it. Corporatism had not carried United States 
foreign policy toward Germany through the Depression and was 
found wanting in dealing with the Nazi government that 
emerged from the economic catastrophe. 
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